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IV. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(4) and § 78-2a-3. 
V. ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issues Presented: (1) The first issue raised by Dixie Riding Club, Inc. ("Dixie") on 
appeal is in respect to the sufficiency of the evidence: Whether the trial court erred in 
concluding that Plaintiffs met their burden by clear and convincing evidence to show 
dedication and abandonment of the road at issue under Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104, where 
Plaintiffs provided seven uncontroverted affidavits, with supporting plats and documents, 
showing use of the road by the public without permission for over ten years. 
Standard of Review: "When reviewing a trial court's decision regarding whether a 
public highway has been established . . . , we review the decision for correctness but grant 
the court significant discretion in its application of the facts to the statute." Dept of Natural 
Resources v. Butler, 2006 UT App 444, f 6, citing Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 310 
(Utah 1997). Since the district court decided this case on summary judgment, the appellate 
court must "review a trial court's summary judgment ruling for correctness and afford no 
deference to its legal conclusions." Gottling v. P.R Inc., 2002 UT 95, \ 5, 61 P.3d 989, 991 
(quoting Utah Coal & Lumber v. Outdoor Endeavors Unlimited, 2001 UT 100, 19, 40 P.3d 581). 
(2) The second issue raised by Dixie on appeal is a new issue, which has been raised 
for the first time on appeal, that the district court erred in not determining the scope or 
width of the road, in spite of the uncontested documentation produced by Plaintiffs which 
showed it to be 50 feet in width, some of which documents were executed by Dixie, and 
1 
Dixie's own acknowledgement that th is width is wl lat is required b}< St. George Qtyioi 
development in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-108. 
Standard of Review: Issues raised for the first time on appeal are not reviewed by 
appellate courts. Domingue^v. Reward, 2006 I J""!1 App 20 Dixie can only get past th is r tile by 
a showing of plain error pursuant to Rule 103(d) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. A showing 
of plain error requires a demonstration that "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have 
been obvious In the trial \ ouii; .uiiJ [m] i l icnmris twuitui, u ,, absent ilit'emn. (hen i A 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for [Defendant]." State v. Alfatlawi, 2006 
UT App 511, at f 12, In respect to a claim of plain error, "the trial court commits error if it 
,U»U>L-S its discretion by acting beyoi id the Ii mits of reasonabi lit) ,"' Id. at 20. 
(3) The third issue raised by Dixie on appeal is whether the district court erred in 
deeming admitted all of Plaintiffs' facts in their Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, 
• •••. ..,. Dixie failed to con test said facts i n the man iiei reqi,.- * • P l'[ ! uih 
Rules of Gvil Procedure, and further that the only supporting evidence presented by Dixie 
were two affidavits that did not materially conflict with Plaintiffs' facts and evidence. 
Standard of Review: While normally an appellate court will review a grant of 
summary judgment for correctness, affording no deference to the district court, "the trial 
court has discretion in requiring compliance with [Rule 7 of the Utah Rules oi \ 
Procedi ire]." Bluffdale City v. Smith, 2007 I JT App 25. at |5 Accordingly, this issue comes 
under the abuse of discretion standard. 
(4) The fourth issue raised by Dixie on appeal is whether the District Court 
improperly weighedt'--1 * • ; * *!•..* '•'• • • * i ' - » ; . ' ^ ; * k k : i\< r •• ! "^u^ i" " v e were no 
2 
disputed facts to weigh due to the court's having deemed all of Plaintiffs' facts admitted; yet 
even if Dixie's facts had not been stricken, Dixie's two affidavits and discovery responses in 
the record did not materially conflict with the facts and evidence presented by Plaintiffs. 
Standard of Review: Trial courts may not weigh disputed evidence when dealing with 
motions for summary judgment. Webster v. Sill^ 675 P.2d 1170,1172-73 (Utah 1983). 
(5) The fifth issue raised by Dixie on appeal is whether the District Court erred in 
ruling that Plaintiffs have standing to maintain an action under Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104, 
on the basis that the standing issue was not whether private parties may bring a claim under 
this statute, but that the evidence presented by Plaintiffs supposedly failed to show public as 
compared to private use of the road, notwithstanding Dixie's own acknowledgement of 
public use of the road and its failure to raise before the trial court the alleged inadequacy in 
Plaintiffs' affidavits of references to the public. This is an issue raised for the first time on 
appeal, and is misstated as a standing issue when it is an issue on sufficiency of the evidence. 
Standard of Review: Issues raised for the first time on appeal are not reviewed by 
appellate courts (Domingue^ p. Reward, 2006 UT App 20), except in cases of plain error. State 
v. Alfatlam, 2006 UT App 511, at \ 12. As with the first issue, this is an issue on sufficiency 
of the evidence, which in the summary judgment context is reviewed for correctness. 
(6) The sixth issue raised by Dixie on appeal is that Plaintiffs improperly failed to 
name St. George City as an indispensable party, on the basis that Plaintiffs' request for 
recognition of the road as abandoned to the public would somehow take away the city's 
easement rights on said property and give it to the state rather than the city. 
3 
Standard of Review: Normally, a court's refusal to join an allegedly indispensable 
party under Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Gvil Procedure is reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard. Green v. Louder, 29 P.3d 638, [^40 (Utah 2001). However, the trial court 
in the present case did not address the elements for a Rule 19 determination, since this issue 
was not raised before it, and is being raised now for the first time on appeal. Dixie is correct 
that "a party may raise the issue of failure to join an indispensable party at anytime in the 
proceedings, including for the first time on appeal." Cassidy v. Salt Lake County Fire Service 
Council, 976 P.2d 607, ^9 (Utah App. 1999). In such a case, the appellate court will address 
the merits of the claim. Id. Accordingly, the court will review whether complete relief can 
be afforded among those already parties in the absence of St. George Qty, and whether "the 
absent person claims an interest in the subject matter of the action and continuing without 
that person would (1) impair the person's ability to protect his or her interest, or (2) expose 
the parties already joined to the action to multiple litigation. Id. at [^10 (citations omitted). 
VI. STATUTES. ORDINANCES AND RULES 
OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104. Public use constituting dedication - Scope. 
(1) A highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public when it has been 
continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period of ten years. 
(2) The dedication and abandonment creates a right-of-way held by the state in 
accordance with Sections 72-3-102, 72-3-104, 72-3-105, and 72-5-103. 
(3) The scope of the right-of-way is that which is reasonable and necessary to ensure safe 
travel according to the facts and circumstances. 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-108. Width of rights-of-way for public highways. 
The width of rights-of-way for public highways shall be set as the highway authorities of 
4 
the state, counties, or municipalities may determine for the highways under their respective 
jurisdiction. 
The following statutes and rules are attached in the Addendum No. 1: 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-103. Acquisition of rights-of-way and other real property- Title to 
property acquired. 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-3-104. City streets - Class C roads — Construction and maintenance. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 7. Pleadings allowed; motions, memoranda, hearings, 
orders, objection to commissioner's order. 
Utah Rules of Gvil Procedure, Rule 19. Joinder of persons needed for just adjudication. 
Utah Rules of Gvil Procedure, Rule 56(e). Summary Judgment. 
VII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND 
DISPOSITION IN COURTS BELOW 
Plaintiffs Val Hafen, Gilbert Jennings, Mansfield Jennings, Conrad Bowler and Lewis 
Bowler ("Plaintiffs") filed this action on April 11, 2003 against Defendant David T. Welch 
and John Does 1-20. The Complaint sought declaratory relief pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 72-5-104. K 1-4. On April 21, 2003, before any responsive pleading had been filed, the 
same Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint. R. 11-14. On June 18,2003, Defendant David 
Welch filed an Answer to the Complaint. R. 15-17. On October 14, 2003, Plaintiffs moved 
to amend the complaint, which motion was subsequently granted on October 29, 2003. R. 
61-63, 77. Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint was filed on October 29, 2003, in which 
Dixie Riding Club, Inc. was substituted for David T. Welch as Defendant, a number of new 
Plaintiffs were added including Jennings Investment, LQ Dorcus N. Bowler, Randy and Gai 
Bowler, Troy and Kerrie Bowler, and John Bowler, and a second cause of action was added 
for a prescriptive easement. & 78-82. On January 9, 2004, Defendant Dixie Riding Club 
filed an Answer to the Second Amended Complaint. & 103-104. 
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Dixie filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the road dedication claim on 
January 14, 2005. & 127-128. The Memorandum in Support of this motion contained a 
heading entitled "Statement of Facts," which contained two brief paragraphs which did not 
contain any facts, but which stated that summary judgment was not being sought on the 
prescriptive easement claim because there was a "substantial factual dispute" as to whether 
such a prescriptive easement existed. R 129-137. The body of the Memorandum asserted a 
variety of legal arguments, interspersed with factual assertions but contained only two 
references to an attached affidavit of Qiarles Welch, for the proposition that St. George Qty 
had at one time discussed acquiring the road but had not done so, and that members of the 
public were invited to use the road to attend rodeo types of events on the adjacent rodeo 
property, "to which their permission ceased after the event was concluded." R 132. 
On March 9, 2005, Plaintiffs filed a Gross Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, which 
also dealt only with the road dedication claim and not the prescriptive easement claim, & 
139-285. Said Cross Motion contained a detailed fact section, supported by seven affidavits 
and numerous plats and related documents. This Motion noted the lack of a fact section in 
Dixie's motion to which it could respond, as required by Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Qvil 
Procedure, and that Dixie had sprinkled its facts throughout its Memorandum. R 142-143. 
(Vol. II). Given the difficulty of identifying and distinguishing Dixie's facts, Plaintiffs 
responded to the same by way of their own detailed statement of facts. K 143. 
On April 28, 2005, Dixie filed an Opposition to Plaintiffs' Gross Motion and Reply. 
R 286-289. Said document did not identify and dispute, with citations to the record, any 
6 
numbered paragraphs of facts set forth by Plaintiffs in their Cross Motion as contemplated 
by Rule 7, and in fact did not contain any fact section at all. Rather, in the argument section, 
Defendant attacked the status or credibility of the Plaintiffs' affiants. Defendant made 
reference to several of Plaintiffs' Affidavits attached to its Cross Motion, claiming that these 
affiants were interested parties and not members of the general public. In support of this 
proposition, Defendant referred to an attached second affidavit of Charles Welch that dealt 
solely with Plaintiffs' affiants. Defendant then attempted to use case law to distinguish 
Plaintiffs' affidavit of David Elwess, attached to Plaintiffs' Cross Motion. 
Plaintiffs filed their Reply on July 11, 2005 (R 293-301), in which they noted that 
"Defendant has nowhere controverted Plaintiffs' facts set forth in Plaintiffs memorandum in 
support of their cross motion for summary judgment, and accordingly each fact properly 
supported by Plaintiffs is deemed admitted." R294. A hearing was held on the parties' 
motions on November 10, 2005 (R 308), and on January 12, 2006, the District Court issued 
its Rulings on Motions for Summary Judgment, in which it deemed Plaintiffs' facts admitted 
and granted Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, and denied that of Dixie. R 309-
311. The court signed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to this effect (R 319-337), 
and a Decree of Dedication on March 7,2006. R 338-40. The 50 foot width of the road is 
contained within the legal description in the Decree of Dedication. R 339. Dixie then filed 
its notice of appeal. R 377-78. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The present matter involves a road adjacent to a former rodeo arena located in 
the City of St. George, Washington County, Utah. The road is in the shape of a reverse "L," 
7 
and is approximately 1,800 feet in length. This road was repeatedly identified by Plaintiffs 
before the trial court as the "1020 West X 1050 North Street." See e.g., R 142; 232-235 (Aff. 
Conrad Bowler, t13, 5, 6, 7, 10, 12). The road connects between two city streets, namely 
1230 North and 1100 West. R 244 (Aff. ¥L Val Hafen J 3). 
2. This road and adjacent arena property were originally owned by the 
Washington County Sheriff's Posse. The arena was used as a race track/rodeo ground and 
stable area for horses roughly 50 years ago. R 232 (Aff. Of Conrad Bowler 12). Dixie 
Riding Club, Inc. is the current title holder of the arena and road. R 139 (Aff. Charles 
Welch 14). However, documents of conveyance in the record show that St. George City 
holds a 46 foot wide easement for utilities under the road property, and holds title to a four 
foot wide strip of land adjacent to the road making a total of 50 feet. R 181. 
3. In 1962, property adjacent to the arena was subdivided for the building of 
homes. The plat of this subdivision identifies the rodeo property and road as the "Possy 
Race Track" The arena and road were not part of the subdivision. R 167 (Aff. D. Elwess t 
3); R 175 (plat). 
4. The arena, road and subdivision were annexed into the City of St. George in 
1972. R 184 (Subpoena response of Washington County). 
5. From at least 1972 or 1973, until shortly after Washington County built the 
arena neighboring the Purgatory Correctional Facility, the sheriff's posse arena was the 
location of numerous rodeos for children and high school rodeos, horse racing or barrel 
racing, amateur rodeos, rodeos on New Year's Day, and other similar events. These public 
8 
events took place roughly four to six times a year. K 139 (Aff. Charles Welch 18); R- 232 
(Aff. Conrad Bowler 14). 
6. The public were invited to use the road to access the arena where these events 
were held, but permission for such use of the road ceased after the event was concluded. 
Defendant asserts that it has never allowed the general public to use the property as a 
thoroughfare, a roadway a right-of-way or any other permissive use except by implied or 
express permission to attend these public rodeo events. & 132; & 139 f 8,140 (Aff. Charles 
Welch 18,110). 
7. Notwithstanding this alleged lack of permission by Dixie, there has never been 
a time since 1967 up until approximately 2002 that Dixie blocked any traffic of any persons 
not specifically members of Dixie, since open and free access existed to the South, to the 
West and to the North. It was not until approximately 2002 that Dixie stopped allowing the 
general public and other persons to use the road by gating the road. & 256 (Dixie's Answer 
to Admission 14); R. 265 (Dixie's Answer to Interrogatory 4). 
8. There was an occasion, sometime between 1985 and 1990, that Dixie put up 
posts and started to build a gate blocking public access to the road. However, after a brief 
legal dispute, Dixie did not proceed with the gate and access through the road remained 
unimpeded. K 245 (Aff. V. Hafen 16). Dixie never put up signs saying the road could not 
be used by the public. & 234 (Aff. Conrad Bowler 18); & 273 (Aff. Gilbert Jennings 16). 
9. Over the years, the general public used the road almost daily. R. 234 (Aff. 
Conrad Bowler 1 8). The road was used by the public to access a feed store and mill just 
9 
west of 1100 West Street for about ten years that was operated by the Ence Brothers, and 
many people used the subject road to get to this store. & 234 (Aff. Conrad Bowler 1 7). 
10. The general public also passed through the road on their way up to the old 
turkey farm about a mile north of the arena, or to access the trail head on the north that lead 
out into the country, up to Snow Canyon and Winchester Hills. K 233 (Affid. Conrad 
Bowler 15); R 239-240 (Aff. Ethan Bundy 14); R 272-273 (Aff. G. Jennings 14). 
11. The road was also used by the general public to access informal rodeo events 
in the arena. R 234-235 (Aff. Conrad Bowler 19); R 240 (Aff. Ethan Bundy 17); R 245 
(Aff. V. Hafen 16); R 274 (Aff. G. Jennings 18). The public drove through the road to 
look at horses stabled along the road, to take horses to be bred or stabled, to discuss 
business regarding their horses, and to buy and sell horses. R 234-235 (Aff. Conrad Bowler 
117,11); R 240-241 (Aff. Ethan Bundy 18); R 245 (Aff. V. Hafen 16); R 274 (Aff. G. 
Jennings 19). 
12. The road was used by the public as a thoroughfare (R 246 Aff. V. Hafen 18), 
and was traveled on continuously by the public in general from about 1972 until 2002. R 
240 (Aff. Ethan Bundy 15); R 279 (Aff. M. Jennings 15). The subject road was open, and 
access was open and unimpeded. The subject road did not dead end in any fashion, 
connected to two public streets in St. George, one on each end, and was continually used by 
the general public from about 1972 until 2002. R 233 (Aff. Conrad Bowler 15); R 244 (Aff. 
V. Hafen 113, 4); R 278, 279 (Aff. M. Jennings 14). Dixie acknowledged that its "implied 
permission" for use of the road to the public was actually by way of mere acquiescence of 
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anyone desiring to use the road. It was not until 2002 that Dixie stopped allowing the 
general public to use the road. R 265. 
13. Regardless of whether it felt it allowed such use, Dixie has not denied or 
asserted any facts contrary to the actual ongoing and continuous use by the general public of 
the road as described above, and has only asserted that such public use was in some fashion 
by way of implied or express permission. R 140 (Aff. Charles Welch if 10); R 255 (Answer 
to Admission 12). 
14. In addition to the general public's use of the road as described above, the 
abutting property owners and others in the nearby neighborhood frequently used the road to 
travel from one part of the neighborhood to another. R 244 (Aff. V. Hafen f 4); R 283 
(Aff. L. Bowler 14). 
15- A number of the Plaintiffs own property that abuts the road in question. 
However, while Plaintiff Conrad Bowler and affiant Ethan Bundy (not a Plaintiff) have 
owned property abutting the road in the past, they do not own such property at present. R 
232 (Aff. Conrad Bowler 13); & 239 (Aff. Ethan Bundy 12). Plaintiffs Gilbert and 
Mansfield Jennings do not personally own property that abuts the road, although they do 
hold an ownership interest in Plaintiff Jennings Investment, LQ that owns property abutting 
the road. R 272 (Aff. G. Jennings f 2); R 278 (Aff. M. Jennings J2). 
16. St. George City or Washington County graded the road occasionally during 
these years of use by the general public. R 235 (Aff. Conrad Bowler 112); R 279 (Aff. M. 
Jennings t6). Legal counsel for the City of St. George asserted that "deeds, and historical 
uses evidence an existing and unimpeded right-of-way adjacent to the Posse Grounds." R 
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249. In addition, Dixie discussed dedication of this road with the Qty of St. George in 1987, 
and a plat was prepared and approved and signed by the city and by Dixie's predecessor in 
title, David Welch, Trustee, although the plat was never recorded. R 139, ff 6-7; R 180; R 
181, R 252 no. 3 and R 456. The plat shows a road width of fifty feet. Id. 
17. Washington County considered the road not to be part of Dixie's arena for 
many years, and did not include it in the legal description for the arena on which property 
taxes were levied. R 171-172 (Aff. D. Elwess t1f 19-20). After many years of being treated 
this way, at Dixie's request the road property was included with the arena property for tax 
purposes in 2002. R 171-173, 258. 
18. The road was identified specifically as a 'road,' a 'public road,' or an 'existing 
roadway in the legal descriptions of numerous deed and conveyance documents, including 
those executed by Dixie. Many of these documents were signed by Defendant and its 
predecessors for conveyances of lots adjacent to the road. Others were signed by owners of 
property adjacent to the road who conveyed four feet of their property to St. George for use 
as a public roadway and easement for utilities. Most of these documents identify the width 
of the road as being fifty feet. R 167-171 (Aff. D. Elwess ff 5-18); R 181 (various deeds). 
VIII. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs included a detailed fact section in their Cross Motion for Summary 
Judgment that was supported in the manner required by Rules 7 and 56 of the Utah Rules of 
Gvil Procedure. Because Dixie did not make any effort to controvert or dispute Plaintiffs' 
facts presented by Plaintiffs in their Cross Motion for Summary Judgment in the manner 
required by Rule 7, the trial court properly deemed those facts admitted. In accordance with 
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the ruling of Bluffdale City v. Smith, 2007 UT App 25, there was no abuse of discretion by the 
trial court in doing so. 
Even if Plaintiffs' facts had not been deemed admitted, a review and comparison of 
the facts asserted in Dixie's affidavits and discovery responses with the affidavits and 
supporting material presented by Plaintiffs shows that there are no material facts in dispute in this 
case. Many of Dixie's asserted facts are not material to dedication of the road. Those that 
are, are not in dispute. Accordingly, the trial court did not weigh disputed evidence because 
there was no disputed evidence to weigh. 
Dixie never disputed the 10+ years of continuous use of the road. Regarding public 
use, Plaintiffs' affidavits overwhelmingly demonstrate observed use of the road by the 
general public— not just the abutting landowners— in traveling to and from a nearby horse-
related business, in accessing a turkey farm and trailheads to the north, and to attend 
informal rodeo events in the arena and simply to go from one part of the neighborhood to 
another. Dixie has not disputed this, but in fact has acknowledged public use of the road so 
extensive that it could not identify the users. Dixie has asserted instead that such use was in 
some fashion by express or implied permission. However, Dixie acknowledged that express 
permission to the 4-6 rodeo events per year was withdrawn after each such event. Dixie's 
explanation of what it meant by implied permission was that use of the road by anyone 
desiring to use it was open and unimpeded, and was by acquiescence. Whether such 
acquiescence is the same as implied permission is a legal question, not a fact. This legal 
question has been answered by the Utah Supreme Court, which has stated that an owner's 
acquiescence in use of a road is interpreted as implied consent by the owner to dedicate the 
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road to the public, rather than as implied permissive use that would prevent such dedication. 
Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097,1099 (Utah 1995). 
The issue of the width of the road has been raised by Dixie for the first time on 
appeal, and has no bearing on whether the road is dedicated to the public. Even if the 
merits of the road width claim are reviewed, the trial court did not err in setting the length of 
the road at fifty feet. Ample evidence was presented by Plaintiffs that this was the width of 
the road, including documents of conveyance from Dixie itself that acknowledged this 
width, and the plat negotiated between Dixie and St. George Qty for dedication of this road. 
Further, Dixie admits that fifty feet is the width of streets in St. George Qty, and the city has 
the right and obligation to set street widths pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-108. Dixie 
will not be harmed by leaving the designated width at fifty feet, since a review of the width 
issue would not result in any different width for this road. 
The trial court did not err in failing to name St. George Qty as in indispensable party. 
Such joinder was not raised below, and therefore joinder is being raised for the first time on 
appeal. The interests of the Qty of St. George are not threatened by the present action 
because if the street is dedicated to the public, the city (rather than the state) will be the party 
receiving the dedicated road, and its prior easement interests will merge therein, whereas if 
the road is not dedicated, the city's easements that it received from Dixie will stay in place 
and the city will lose nothing. The city's interests are already protected and will not be 
impaired if they are not joined, and there is no danger of a double recovery in this case. 
Joinder of the city is not necessary for a full and fair adjudication of this matter. 
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IX. ARGUMENT 
Dixie has raised six issues on appeal as to why dedication of the road at issue by the 
trial court was supposedly improper. Each will be discussed below. The order in which the 
issues will be discussed has been rearranged from that asserted by Dixie for the sake of 
clarity and because resolution of some issues tends to impact others. 
A. The Trial Court Properly Deemed Plaintiffs5 Facts Admitted 
Dixie asserts that the trial court elevated form over substance and abused its 
discretion by deeming admitted all of Plaintiffs' facts, since they were not controverted by 
Dixie as required by Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Qvil Procedure. Dixie's brief at 28. Dixie 
cites two cases in support of this proposition, Salt Lake County v. Metro West Ready Mix, Inc., 
89 P.3d 155, n4 (Utah 2004), and Gary "Porter Const v. Fox Const, Inc., 101 P.3d 371 (Utah 
App. 2004). As this court well knows, the statements from these cases can no longer be 
used to support Dixie's claims. 
As this court recently stated, "the district court's discretion in enforcing compliance 
with Rule 7(c)(3)(B) has been addressed in several cases decided under the former but 
comparable Rule 4-501 (2) (B) of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. This court in 
Fennel! v. Green, 2003 UT App 291, 77 P.3d 339, relying on the supreme court's ruling in 
Lovendahl v. Jordan School District, 2002 UT 130, 63 P.3d 705, held that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in deeming facts admitted due to noncompliance with Rule 4-501(2)(B)." 
Bluffdale City v. Smith, 2007 UT App 25, at f 8. 
However, a statement by the Supreme Court subsequent to the Lovendahl case created 
uncertainty about whether a trial court may deem a party's facts admitted where the facts 
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have not been controverted as provided in Rule 7. In the 2004 case of Metro West, "the 
supreme court, in a footnote, ruled plaintiff's failure to comply with the technical 
requirements of rule 4-501 (2) (b) to be harmless because 'the disputed facts were clearly 
provided in the body of the memorandum with applicable record references.'" Bluffdale City, 
at 19. 
Because of this new uncertainty about how Rule 7 was to be interpreted, later in the 
year of 2004, this court in Gary Porter v. Fox felt constrained to find an abuse of discretion by 
the trial court for deeming incontroverted facts admitted under the rule. Gary Porter v. Fox, 
at f 15. However, in footnote 2 of the same opinion, this court discussed the uncertain 
meaning of Rule 7, and invited the supreme court to clarify the issue. Id. at n. 2. The 
guidance from the supreme court came the next year in the case of Anderson DeveL Co. v. 
Tobias, 2005 UT 36. In footnote 3 of that case, the supreme court cited Gary Porter v. Fox 
and Fennell v. Green, for the proposition that "courts have 'discretion in requiring compliance 
with rule 4-501.'" Then the court stated that "[wjhile the district court could have granted 
Tobias and Feld's motion for summary judgment on the basis of ADC's noncompliance with 
Rule 4-501, it exercised its discretion to address the motion on its merits, and we are 
unpursuaded that doing so constituted an abuse of that discretion." Hence, the supreme 
court indicated that appellate courts will respect the discretion of the trial courts in deeming 
a party's facts admitted if Rule 7 is not followed. 
This court applied this newly clarified standard in the recent Bluffdale case, which has 
many similarities to the present case. This court in Bluffdale quoted the entirety of the fact 
section at issue in that case, and noted that it contained only two references to an attached 
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affidavit, and did not comply with Rue 7. Bluffdale, at f 11. This court then upheld the trial 
court's discretion in deeming admitted the other parties' facts. 
This case is like Bluffdale. Dixie's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for 
Summary Judgment did not allege any facts in its section entitled "Statement of Facts," but 
instead peppered various unsupported factual allegations throughout its arguments. K 129-
136. In the body of its argument it made only two references to the attached Affidavit of 
Charles Welch (R. 132), regarding Dixie's negotiations with St. George Qty about dedication 
of the road, and the withdrawal of permission for use of the road after rodeo events, neither of 
which is disputed by Plaintiffs. K 456; 232 (Aff. Conrad Bowler \ 4). More tellingly, after 
Plaintiffs submitted their own Cross Motion for Summary Judgment with 18 numbered 
paragraphs of supported facts, Dixie in its Memorandum in Opposition and Reply made no 
attempt to identify any of these 18 paragraphs that it felt were controverted; neither did 
Dixie make any meaningful reference to its own affidavits to controvert Plaintiffs' facts. 
Indeed, as explained hereafter, Dixie's affidavits do not materially conflict with Plaintiffs' 
facts. Dixie's Memorandum in Opposition and Reply did not even contain a fact section. 
Hence, Dixie did not even come as close to compliance with Rule 7 as the losing party in 
Bluffdale, who at least included a fact section in its Memorandum in Opposition. 
In light of the above, the trial court properly exercised its discretion and justifiably 
deemed admitted all of Plaintiffs' facts. There simply was no abuse of discretion here. 
B. The Trial Court did not Improperly Weigh Disputed Evidence 
Dixie asserts that the trial court improperly weighed disputed evidence in this case. 
As noted above, it was within the trial court's sound discretion to strike Dixie's asserted facts 
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and deem admitted all of Plaintiffs' facts due to Dixie's failure to follow Rule 7. The trial 
court's comment that Plaintiffs' materials struck the court as "clearly more detailed and 
analytical" (R 309) was nothing more than an observation of the manner in which Plaintiffs 
presented their case, as well as Dixie's noncompliance with Rule 7, and had nothing to do 
with weighing of the evidence. Because Plaintiffs' facts were deemed admitted, it was 
impossible for there to be a weighing of the evidence because there was only one set of facts 
presented and nothing to weigh them against. 
However, even if we ignored Rule 7, the trial court did not improperly weigh 
disputed evidence in this case because even if both sets of facts were still at issue, there was still no 
materially disputed evidence to weigh, because there is no material fact in dispute. 
Dixie submitted two affidavits to the trial court, the first accompanying its Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment, and the second accompanying its Memorandum in 
Opposition and Reply. K 138-141 (Vol. II), 290-291. Plaintiffs also cited discovery 
responses from Dixie in their Cross Motion for Summary Judgment that were signed under 
oath by a representative of Dixie. R 251-269. These two affidavits and discovery responses 
contain all of the evidence on the table from Dixie.1 In contrast, Plaintiffs submitted six 
affidavits with a number of supporting documents. As will be seen, rather surprisingly, there 
are no material disputed issues of fact between the evidence from Dixie and that from 
Plaintiffs. 
1
 As noted above, Dixie hardly mentioned these affidavits in its pleadings, and did not 
mention the discovery responses at all. Plaintiffs refer to these discovery responses and 
affidavits to show that, even if all of the possible evidence from Dixie is considered, Dixie 
still has not raised any material issues of disputed facts in this case. 
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Dixie's first affidavit contains 17 paragraphs. & 138-141. The first two merely 
identify the affiant, Charles Welch, as an officer of Dixie with authority to execute the 
affidavit, which is not contested. & 138. The third paragraph states that all of the Plaintiffs 
are adjacent property owners, directly or indirectly. K 139. The Affidavit of Conrad Bowler 
submitted by Plaintiffs indicates that Mr. Bowler is not presently an adjacent property owner 
(K 232,13), as does the Affidavit of Ethan Bundy (K 239, f 2).2 At first blush this appears 
to create an issue of fact. However, Ethan Bundy is not a Plaintiff. Further he 
acknowledged in his affidavit that he was a former owner of adjacent property abutting the 
road (K 239,12). As one of the original owners and developers of the adjacent Ence 
Bowler Marsh subdivision, the same is true of Conrad Bowler. & 232, f 2. Indeed, Charles 
Welsh himself clarifies in his second affidavit that "each one of them [plaintiffs] has been, or 
in fact, is presently an adjacent property owner," and further that Ethan Bundy was a former 
owner. & 291, ff 3, 6-8. Plaintiffs do not dispute the former ownership status of Conrad 
Bowler or Ethan Bundy. Hence, there is no material dispute over the property ownership 
status of Plaintiffs. 
The fourth and fifth paragraphs of Charles Welch's first affidavit (K 139) state that 
the subject property is described on the deed that was issued to Dixie, and that Dixie has 
paid all tax bills it has received. Plaintiffs do not dispute these facts. While Plaintiffs have 
pointed out that the road was not taxed by Washington County for a number of years (K 
2
 The affidavits of Gilbert and Mansfield Jennings also establish that they do not personally 
own property abutting the road, but they do have an ownership interest in Plaintiff Jennings 
Investment, LC, which does own property abutting the road. & 272,12, 278, f 2. This 
appears to be the reason for Mr. Welch's reference to ownership "directly or indirectly" in 
his affidavit. 
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171-172, tf 19-20), this does not change the fact that the original deed included the road and 
Dixie has paid all its tax bills that it has received, even if the road was not part of what was 
taxed. Dixie cites these paragraphs of Mr. Welch's affidavit as support for an asserted 
dispute of fact regarding whether Dixie conveyed a 46 foot easement to the Gty of St. 
George, followed by an adjoining 4 foot easement. See Dixie's brief, page 34, footnote 8. 
However, Mr. Welch's affidavit said nothing about such an easement and ownership, but 
only stated that the original deed included the road property, and that Dixie has paid taxes 
on its property. Moreover, the Warranty Deed and Right-of-Way Easement conveyance 
documents in the record (R 182, subparts A.4.1 and A.4.2) clearly show that Dixie did in 
fact make these conveyances. In sum, there is no dispute of these paragraphs, and any 
assertion to the contrary in footnote 8 of Dixie's brief is unsupported by the record. 
Paragraphs 6 and 7 of Mr. Welch's first affidavit (R 139) state that Dixie and St. 
George City discussed dedication of the road at one point in time, but the dedication was 
never consummated since the plat was never recorded. Plaintiffs do not contest this, and in 
fact the unrecorded plat in question was included among their exhibits accompanying their 
Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. R 454 - 456. While Dixie in its discovery responses 
denies that several property owners abutting the subject road signed this plat, on the basis 
that it could not verify their signatures (R 252-254), this is not material to the issues before 
the trial court or this court. Interestingly, David Welch, trustee of Dixie's predecessor in 
title, did sign the dedication plat. R 252 no. 3; R 456. 
Paragraph 8 of Mr. Welch's affidavit (R 139) states that over the years Dixie 
scheduled a number of rodeo type events on its property, a fact that is confirmed by 
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Plaintiffs5 affidavits and clearly is not disputed. K 232 (Aff. Conrad Bowler, f 4), K 239 
(Aff. Ethan Bundy, J 3). 
Paragraph 9 of Mr. Welch's affidavit (K 140) states that "from time to time, with our 
express permission, or with our implied permission, we have allowed adjacent land owners to 
use the property." (emphasis added). Mr. Welch specifically qualified this statement as 
pertaining solely to the use of adjacent landowners, not the general public. Dixie itself has 
pointed out that neighbor use of a claimed thoroughfare— with or without permission— is 
not material to a road dedication. Dixie's brief, at 20-21. Therefore, irrespective of whether 
use of the road by adjacent landowners was with or without permission, there is no material 
dispute regarding this fact that would prevent Plaintiffs' requested summary judgment. 
Paragraph 10 of Mr. Welch's affidavit (K 140) states that "[w]e, the Dixie Riding 
Club, have never allowed the general public to use the property as a thoroughfare, a 
roadway, a right-of-way, or any other permissive use save and except if by implied or express 
permission." Similar statements regarding express or implied permission to the public are 
repeated a number of times by Dixie. For example, paragraph 15 of the same affidavit states 
that "any use of the property has been permissive." & 140. Similar statements are repeated 
in Dixie's discovery responses. & 255-256, 258. 
These statements about express and implied permission go to the heart of Dixie's 
claim that there are disputed issues of fact regarding permissive use. However, the express 
permission referred to by Dixie relates to attendance by the public at the 4 to 6 public 
rodeos held at the arena every year. Plaintiffs do not dispute this and indeed acknowledge the 
same by affidavit. & 232, \ 4. After these public events, Dixie's permission ceased. & 139 
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18 (Vol. II); K 132. Dixie also asserted in its discovery responses that it gave express 
permission to the operators of a tack/saddle business, and a breeding business abutting the 
road for a number of years. R 257. Plaintiffs do not dispute the existence of the 
tack/saddle and breeding businesses, or whether such use was permissive. & 235, Vi 10-11. 
As for the implied permission referred to by Dixie, the nature of this implied 
permission is described by Dixie itself in its discovery responses. Dixie stated in response to 
an interrogatory that it identify all permissions for use of the road that " the permission was, in 
fact, granted by acquiescence\ since there was, as having heretofore been mentioned, adequate 
egress and ingress up until the point that the Plaintiff Jennings built the shopping center 
complex. Therefore, it was by acquiescence of anyone desiring to use the property and it was 
only until approximately two years ago that the Defendants stopped allowing the general 
public, the Defendants, and other parties, who in fact, would now have the status of a 
trespasser, if in fact, they came upon the property." K 265 # 4 (emphasis added). This is 
corroborated by Dixie's statement that "[t]here has never been a time since 1967 up until 
approximately two (2) years ago, that there was any necessity of blocking any traffic of any 
persons not specifically members of the Dixie Riding Club, Inc., because open and free 
access existed to the South, to the West, and to the North. Only when the Plaintiffs, 
Jennings built a shopping center complex, did the restriction of access to the areas, having 
heretofore been articulated, was cut off by the fabrication of the shopping center complex." 
R 256. This is why Dixie was unable to identify the users of the property that they claim to 
have given express or implied permission to, since the use by the public was wide open. No 
effort was made to block such use, and therefore Dixie was "without sufficient knowledge to 
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know any such individuals or witnesses," and even the suggestion that it could identify such 
persons was "an impractical request" that was broad and overly burdensome. R 265. 
Whether Dixie's claim that implied permissive acquiescence of this type can legally 
constitute permission for use is an entirely separate legal question, which will be discussed in 
more detail in subpart C below. For present purposes, it is enough to see that there is no 
dispute between the evidence presented by Dixie and that presented by Plaintiffs on this 
issue, since Plaintiffs acknowledged this same wide open, unimpeded nature of the use due to Dixie's 
acquiescence. For example, Conrad Bowler stated that "the subject road was open, and access 
was open and unimpeded," and that "no gates limited access to the subject road or through 
the subject road in any fashion" before 2002. & 233,11 5-6. "There were never any 
restrictions for use" of the road, and "there was never any indication that the subject road 
was not a public road open to use by the general public." R 234, 11 7-8. Similar statements 
are found in the other affidavits submitted by Plaintiffs. R 239-241 (Aff. Ethan Bundy, 11 
4, 5,10); R 244-245 (Aff. Val Hafen, 114-6); R 273-275 (Aff. Gilbert Jennings, 114, 6,9); 
R 279-280 (Aff. Mansfield Jennings, 114, 5, 8); R 283-284 (Aff. Lewis Bowler, 114, 5, 6). 
Val Hafen said that "sometime between 1985 and 1990, Defendant put up posts and started 
to build a gate blocking public access to the subject road. A brief legal dispute arose, and 
Defendant did not proceed with the gate. Access through the subject road remained 
unimpeded." R 245,16. 
In sum, regarding paragraph 10 of Mr. Welch's affidavit, when the totality of Dixie's 
statements are reviewed and compared with those of Plaintiffs, it is seen that there is no 
dispute at all. Both parties agree that express permission to rodeos occurred 4 to 6 times per 
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year, after which permission was withdrawn. Both parties agree that the implied permission 
claimed by Dixie was nothing other than acquiescence by Dixie in use of the road, and that 
use of the road was wide open and unimpeded. In short, Dixie's repeated statements that all 
use was permissive or by implication is simply a self-serving legal conclusion, which cannot 
prevent a road dedication or create an issue of disputed fact. 
Paragraphs 11 and 12 of Mr. Welch's affidavit (R 140) (Vol. II) pertain to a 
photograph of the road taken by Mr. Welch in 2005 (R 143), long after the 10 years of 
continuous use of the road needed for the road dedication, and three years after Dixie finally 
gated the road. Plaintiffs do not dispute the existence of this photograph or that it 
accurately portrayed the appearance of the road at the time it was taken, but simply note that 
the road had fallen into disrepair, since the picture was taken three years after Dixie gated it. 
R 235-236 (Aff. Conrad Bowler, 113); R 245 (Aff. Val Hafen, 17); R 284 (Aff. Lewis 
Bowler, f 7). The statement in paragraph 12 of the affidavit that the photograph shows that 
the road "does not meet the criteria as outlined in the statutory language of the law, the case 
law, or any other facet of rights" is not a fact but a legal conclusion, and cannot prevent 
summary judgment. 
Paragraph 13 of Mr. Welch's affidavit (R 140) (Vol. II) states that "at no time has the 
Dixie Riding Club ever, by design, board action, or use ever abandoned the subject property, 
as required by the code." This is again a legal conclusion. Plaintiffs do not dispute that 
Dixie has not expressly abandoned the road by formal action. Indeed, Plaintiffs would not 
have brought this suit if there had been such a formal abandonment. However, whether the 
road is to be considered abandoned to public use pursuant to the statute is a separate matter, 
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and was the ultimate issue to be decided by the trial court, and the ultimate issue being 
reviewed by this court. "An affidavit is deficient if it 'reveal[s] no evidentiary facts, but 
merely reflects] the affiant's unsubstantiated opinions and conclusions."' Orris v. Johnson, 
2006 UT App 394,120 citing Trelo^an v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747, 748 (Utah 1985). 
Paragraphs 14 through 17 of Mr. Welch's affidavit (R 140-141) refer to the recent 
shopping center built by Jennings, and Dixie's decision to block access by gating the road. 
Plaintiffs do not dispute these facts. These paragraphs also make repeated reference to 
"open hostile and notorious" use of the road by Plaintiffs. Again, whether Plaintiffs current 
use (or inability to use) the road is open, hostile and notorious is a legal conclusion and 
cannot be established by a mere conclusory statement in an affidavit. Furthermore, current 
blockage of the road is not material to whether there were ten years or more of public use of 
the road under the statute. The 'open and hostile' language appears to be directed at 
Plaintiff's prescriptive easement claim, which is not at issue in this appeal. 
There are no more paragraphs in the first affidavit of Mr. Welch, and as has been 
seen above, none of the paragraphs in that affidavit raise facts in dispute. The second 
affidavit of Charles Welch has eight paragraphs (K 290-291), and is directed solely at 
Plaintiffs' affiants. In our discussion of the 3rd paragraph of the first affidavit above, we 
already discussed the assertions contained in paragraphs 3, and 6 through 8 of the second 
affidavit, in respect to the past or present ownership interest of Plaintiffs, and Ethan Bundy 
in particular. There is no dispute regarding these paragraphs since Plaintiffs acknowledge 
that the affiants in question are current or former owners of property adjacent to the road. 
Paragraph 1 of the second affidavit again only establishes Mr. Welch's identity, while 
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paragraph 2 only states that he is not familiar with David Elwess, which is not in dispute. 
Paragraph 4 of the second affidavit discusses the Affidavit of David Elwess attached to 
Plaintiff's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, and merely offers the conclusion, in 
somewhat confusing language, that "were those facts in dispute [the facts given in the 
Elwess affidavit], would state while true, do not change the status of the property in 
question." K 291,14. Hence, Mr. Welch acknowledges that the facts asserted in the 
Elwess affidavit are not disputed. Paragraph 5 states only that Mr. Welch relies on his 
previous affidavit. Hence, there are no paragraphs of the second affidavit that are disputed 
either. 
Most of the issues raised in Dixie's discovery responses were discussed above, since 
these discovery responses generally coincide with and repeat and further explain the 
statements made by Mr. Welch in his affidavits. The only other issue discussed in Dixie's 
discovery responses not discussed above has to do with why Dixie feels the county did not 
assess taxes on the road for a time (R. 258), which is not necessarily material to the present 
summary judgment motions on dedication of the road, although that fact supports Dixie's 
acquiescence to treat the road as a public road. 
The bottom line is that the trial court did not weigh any disputed evidence because 
there was no disputed evidence to weigh. Dixie has repeatedly asserted in its brief that there 
are supposedly issues of fact in dispute, but as seen above, there simply are none. Rather, 
there are disputed issues of law, primarily about whether the self-styled 'implied permission 
by acquiescence' from Dixie for public use of the road is legally sufficient under Utah law. 
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Apart from the affidavits and discovery responses, in its brief, Dixie asserts a variety 
of facts that it claims are in dispute, even though it has offered little if any supporting 
evidence for the same. One example is Dixie's assertion that there is a dispute of material 
fact about whether Plaintiffs' evidence of public use (1) sufficiently identifies who is the 
'public,' or (2) sufficiently demonstrates public use as compared to neighbors' use. Dixie's 
brief at 23-24. However, these are issues related to the sufficiency of the evidence at law, 
not disputed facts. Furthermore, regarding the first of these, not one single time in any 
affidavit or discovery response did Dixie ever raise before the trial court the issue of 
Plaintiffs' alleged failure to identify the public, as is demonstrated by the discussion above. 
There is no statement in the affidavits or discovery responses saying that the public was not 
properly identified by Plaintiff. This 'disputed fact' is being raised for the first time on 
appeal, without any support. As for sufficient demonstration of public (as compared to 
neighbor) use of the road, it is noteworthy that the affidavits and discovery responses from 
Dixie before the trial court never once stated that the public did not use the road, and on the 
contrary acknowledged that such public use was apparently so extensive that Dixie could not 
identify the users. & 265. Dixie admitted in 2004 that it was only "approximately two years 
ago that the Defendants stopped allowing the general public" to use the road. R. 265. 
Rather, the Welch affidavits and Dixie's discovery responses merely discussed the neighbor 
status of Plaintiffs' affiants, without dealing at all with whether these affiants' observations 
of public use of the road were correct. Indeed, Dixie's steadfast position before the trial 
court was that the uncontested public use of the road was by permission, express or implied. 
& 140, K 9 (Vol. II); 132; 265. Again, whether the use referred to in Plaintiffs' affidavits was 
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sufficient to meet the public use requirement of the statute is a sufficiency of the evidence 
issue. As will be seen in subpart C below, there is more than enough clear and convincing 
evidence to sustain the trial court's findings of public use of the road, regardless of 
concurrent neighbor use. 
A final note is in order regarding Dixie's assertion that supposedly almost all road 
dedication cases in Utah have not been decided on summary judgment because they are too 
fact intensive. This is not true. In addition to Renfro v. McCowan, 2006 WL 3254509 (D. 
Utah 2006), which Dixie acknowledged in its brief as being decided on summary judgment, 
Dixie conveniently overlooked other Utah cases regarding road dedications that were also 
decided on summary judgment.3 In particular, Dixie overlooked Schaer v. State, 657 P.2d 
1337 (Utah 1983), in which a road dedication was found by the Utah Supreme Court on 
summary judgment. Just as here, the party opposing dedication had failed to submit any 
material evidence against the dedication. The court stated, 
[W]here the moving party's evidentiary material is in itself sufficient and the opposing 
party fails to proffer any evidentiary matter when he is presumably in a position to do 
so, the courts should be justified in concluding that no genuine issue of fact is 
present, nor would one be present at trial. 
Upon a motion for summary judgment, the courts ought to recognize, as a minimum, 
that the opposing party produce some evidentiary matter in contradiction of the 
movant's case or specify in an affidavit the reason why he cannot do so. 
3
 In addition to Schaer was the case of Gillmor v. Carter, 391 P.2d 426 (Utah 1964) in which 
dedication was denied on summary judgment not because of any facts in dispute, but 
because the facts showed that the underlying property owner made sure all use was 
permissive by putting up signs and gates along the road. This is similar to Draper City v. 
Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1995), cited by Dixie, in which summary judgment was denied 
because of affidavits from the underlying property owners that they had made every effort to 
block trespassing along the road. As noted above, such is not the case here since Dixie did 
not block use of the road or put up signs or gates until recently. 
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Where ... the materials presented by the moving party are sufficient to entitle him to a 
directed verdict [as a matter of law] and the opposing party fails either to offer 
counterafi idavits or other materials that raise a credible issue [of fact] or to show that 
he has evidence not then available, summary judgment maybe rendered for the 
moving party. 
Id. at 1341-1342, citing Duplerv. Yates, 351 P.2d 624, 637 (1960)(citations omitted). Such is 
the case here. As has been demonstrated above, Dixie did not submit facts to dispute the 
road dedication at issue. It provided no facts to dispute the continuous use of the road or 
the ten year use of the road by the public. It provided no facts— regardless of any use by 
local residents— to show there was no use by the general public. Indeed, Dixie conceded 
use by the public, but claimed such use was by permission— yet, Dixie admitted that its 
implied permission was nothing more or less than acquiescence in use of the road. Just as in 
Schaer where the party opposing road dedication asserted res judicata, Dixie merely asserted 
a legal argument against road dedication, that use by acquiescence is the same as implied 
permission. Just as in Schaer^ such a legal argument must fail. 
In addition, Dixie itself noted the recent case of Renfro v. McCowa% 2006 WL 3254509 
(D. Utah 2006), in which a road dedication was found to exist under the statute on summary 
judgment. Contrary to Dixie's assertions, Renfro is not distinguishable from the present case, 
but is almost identical. Dixie claims there is a distinction because "in Renfro the defendant 
conceded that the general public used the road without permission ... whereas use by the 
public and use by permission both are contested issues in this case" (Dixie's brief at 25). 
However, the legal issues of public use and permission for use were indeed contested in 
Renfro. In fact, the defendant in Renfro claimed that the road should not be dedicated to the 
public because of "an alleged dispute as to whether it is, indeed, the 'public' that has used the 
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road." Id. at *1. This is identical to the argument raised by Dixie (without evidentiary 
support) about the sufficiency of the evidence of public use in the present case. 
Furthermore, just as in this case, in respect to permissive use, in Renfro it was shown 
that the owner of the property during the ten year period never "permitted the public to 
come onto his property, or attempted to deter anyone from use of the road." Id. at *3. This 
is the same as Dixie's admission in this case that it has never allowed the general public to 
use the road (R. 140, f 10), and that "there has never been a time since 1967 up until 
approximately two (2) years ago, that there was any necessity of blocking any traffic of any 
persons not specifically members of the Riding Club, Inc., because open and free access 
existed to the South, to the West and to the North." K 256. In spite of disputed legal issues 
regarding public use, or use by permission, the Renfro court stated that the "unobstructed and 
constant use by numerous recreationists and sightseers, provides clear and convincing 
evidence that the users were not adjacent landowners, but members of the public enjoying 
the outdoors. Renfro, therefore, has provided clear and convincing evidence that the Road 
was a public thoroughfare for the purposes of Utah Code § 72-5-104." Id. at *5. As will be 
seen below, the same is true here, in light of the overwhelming evidence of public use of the 
road. 
C. Plaintiffs met their burden of showing dedication of the road at issue by clear 
and convincing evidence, and had standing to do so. 
Dixie has challenged the sufficiency of Plaintiff's evidence in this case, asserting that 
dedication of the road to the public under the statute was for some reason not established by 
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clear and convincing evidence. As will be seen, this claim is contrary to the facts.4 
Utah courts have indicated that road dedications under Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 
must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Wasatch County v. Okelberry^ 2006 UT 
App 473 at f 9, citing AWINC p. Simonsen, 2005 UT App 168, if 7. The clear and convincing 
evidence standard is a mid level review, between the standard of a 'preponderance of the 
evidence' and 'proof beyond a reasonable doubt.' "Clear and convincing evidence requires 
more clear and persuasive evidence and not subject to as much doubt as where only a 
preponderance of the evidence is required." Harmon v. Rasmussen, 375 P.2d 762 (Utah 1962). 
There are three points that must be established for a road dedication to the public, 
namely (1) continuous use of the road (2) as a public thoroughfare (3) for ten or more years. 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104. Dixie has not provided any facts or asserted any arguments in 
respect to (1) lack of continuous use, or (3) the ten year period in any of the documents it 
filed with the trial court or with this court. Plaintiffs established continuous use for more 
than ten years in the affidavits of Conrad Bowler (K 233, if 6), Ethan Bundy (R. 240, if 8), 
Val Hafen (R. 244,14), Gilbert Jennings (K 273, if 4), Mansfield Jennings (EL 279, if4), and 
Lewis Bowler (R. 283, if 4). Dixie did not controvert these facts, and accordingly the trial 
court found continuous use for over ten years in this case. K 351, if 10, K 360, if 4. 
4
 In footnote 2 of Dixie's brief, Dixie attacks Plaintiffs' affidavits which support road 
dedication as supposedly 'inadmissably vague, conclusory and without foundation,' and 
asserts that they should not be relied on at all. However, not only is this incorrect but Dixie 
did not move to strike these affidavits before the trial court, and therefore waived its right to 
contest them now. Pinetree Associates v. Ephraim City, 67 P.3d 462, if 19 (Utah 2003) ("Formal 
or evidentiary defects in an affidavit in support or opposition to a motion for summary 
judgment are waived in the absence of a motion to strike or other objection."). 
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Dixie asserts that Plaintiffs failed to satisfy the public thoroughfare requirement for a 
road dedication by clear and convincing evidence. The public thoroughfare element requires 
proof of three sub elements, namely, (i) passing or travel (ii) by the public (iii) without 
permission. Heber City v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 311 (Utah 1997). Dixie does not contest the 
first of these, passing or travel, but focuses solely on use by the public and permission for 
such use. Each will be discussed below. 
1. Use by the Public Dixie has argued two points in respect to public use. 
First, Dixie asserts that because Plaintiffs are current or former owners, or part owners, of 
property abutting the road whose testimony supposedly relates only to local use of the road, 
they lack standing to even bring the present suit at all, or alternatively to testify about public 
use. Second, even if they did have standing and could testify of public use, they testified 
primarily of their own local use, and were somehow not specific or clear enough in their 
observations of public use. 
a. Standing Dixie makes much of the fact that all of Plaintiffs' affiants 
are current or former owners, or part owners, of property abutting the road at issue. Dixie 
asserts as its fifth issue on appeal that this disqualifies them from having standing to bring 
the present action. As a preliminary matter, it must be observed that this is a new issue, 
raised for the first time on appeal Whenever the term 'standing' was used by Dixie before 
the trial court, the lack of standing asserted was the alleged inability of Plaintiffs as private 
citizens to bring an action on behalf of the Qty of St. George. K 130-31,134-36, 287,310. 
There was no mention of their supposedly not having standing because they were adjacent 
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property owners. Because this is a new issue raised for the first time on appeal, it should not 
be considered at all. Domingue^ v. Heward, 2006 UT App 20. 
Yet even if we reach the merits of Dixie's new argument on standing, it is not well 
founded. In raising this issue, Dixie confuses issues of standing with issues of sufficiency of 
the evidence, which are two entirely separate legal concepts. Dixie asserts that since the 
Plaintiffs are former or current adjacent property owners who supposedly cannot testify 
regarding public use of the road (an argument discussed more particularly below), this means 
that they also lacked standing to bring this suit at all. This is simply not true. 
Standing is found where a "party has suffered or will 'suffer some distinct and 
palpable injury that gives [it] a personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute," or 
alternatively where an appropriately situated party seeks to pursue an issue which is of 
sufficient public importance to warrant a grant of standing. Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality 
Board, 2006 UT 74, at \\ 19, 39, OQD% Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145,1150 (Utah 1983). 
Plaintiffs clearly have standing here since many of them will lose an access road abutting 
their properties if Dixie prevails, and the issue of dedication of this public road is of 
sufficient public importance that it should be raised. Indeed, Utah courts for decades have 
never objected to the standing of adjacent property owners to raise road dedication claims.5 
Finally, and apparently in the alternative, Dixie appears to suggest (particularly in its 
arguments to the trial court below) that because Plaintiffs were supposedly "interested 
5
 See: Peterson v. Combe, 438 P.2d 545 (Utah 1968), Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.ld 910 (Utah App. 
1996), Memott v. Anderson, 642 P.2d 750 (Utah 1982), Bertagnole p. Pine Meadow, 639 P.2d 211 
(Utah 1981), Pitts p. Roberts, 562 P.2d 231 (Utah 1971), Harding p. Bohman, 491 P.2d 233 (Utah 
1971), Bonner P. Sudbury, 417 P.2d 646 (Utah 1966), and AWJNC p. Simonsen, 112 P.3d 1228 
(Utah App. 2005). 
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parties" by virtue of having owned property abutting the road, they could not testify about 
the public's use of the road. K 133, 136, 287. This idea is apparently derived from the 
statement in Peterson, cited in Dixie's brief, that "[adjoining] property owners cannot be 
considered members of the public generally, as that term generally is used in dedication by 
user statutes." Peterson, 438 P.2d at 546, and Dixie's Brief, at 19. However, the Peterson court 
also said that adjacent property owners "could testify as to what others not so situate might 
have done to perfect a dedication, including, if they could prove it, daily Greyhound Lines 
passengers." Id. at 547 (emphasis added). Indeed, the same cases cited in footnote 6 above 
in respect to standing show that courts have freely relied on the testimony of adjacent 
landowners to establish use of the road by the general public. Such a position makes sense 
since there is no one better situated to testify of use of a road by the public than a neighbor. 
In sum, Dixie's argument that Plaintiffs somehow lacked standing to bring the 
present action due to their property ownership status is contrary to the law. 
b. Facts Regarding Local and General Use of the Road Dixie asserts 
that the road dedication must fail on the basis of sufficiency of the evidence, since Plaintiffs 
allegedly testified primarily of their own use, and were somehow not specific or clear enough 
in their observations of public use. As a preliminary matter, Plaintiffs acknowledge that 
there was clearly use of the road at issue by abutting landowners and other nearby neighbors, 
and that their affiants made some reference to this use. This is only natural since the 
adjacent subdivision was oriented toward horse ownership, and "this area was horse 
country." & 232, 234, fl 2, 7. However, this in no way mitigates the extensive testimony by 
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Plaintiffs' affiants regarding the additional repeated and continuous use by the general public 
of this road. 
Plaintiffs provided evidence that over the years, the general public used the road 
almost daily. R. 234 (Aff. Conrad Bowler ^ 8). The road was used by the public to access a 
feed store6 and mill operated by the Ence brothers west of the road for about ten years, and 
many people used the subject road to get to this store. & 234 (Aff. Conrad Bowler ^ 7). It 
defies logic and common sense that the only customers to use the road to reach this business 
were the property owners adjacent to the road. 
The same is true of the public that came to watch informal rodeo events in the arena. 
As noted by Plaintiffs' affiants, the arena was used extensively for rodeo events until the 
county built a new arena near the purgatory jail. & 232 (Aff. Conrad Bowler, % 4); R. 239 
(Aff. Ethan Bundy, 13); & 272 (Aff. Gilbert Jennnings, f 3). Dixie has stated that 
permission for formal scheduled events was withdrawn after each such event ended. & 132; 
R. 139,18 (Vol. II). Because such permission was withdrawn, there was no permission for 
the informal practices. It again defies logic and common sense that the same public that 
came to these formal rodeo events was not the same public that was observed coming to the 
6
 This store is not to be confused with the tack and saddle shop which Plaintiffs indicated 
was just south of the arena (K 241, Aff. Ethan Bundy 19; 245, Aff. V. Hafen ^ 6), or the 
horse breeding business along the road (K 235, Aff. Conrad Bowler f 11), both of which 
businesses Dixie has stated were located along the road in question with its express 
permission. R. 257. Traffic to and from these businesses by the public is omitted from the 
present discussion based on Dixie's assertion that the same was a permissive use, for 
purposes of the present summary judgment. The Ence business however was not located 
along the subject road, nor has Dixie asserted that use of the road by its business invitees 
was with permission. Rather, according to Plaintiffs' unrefuted testimony, the general public 
used the subject road to access this business. & 234, if 7. 
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arena for informal practice events, and that the informal practices were only by the 
neighbors. 
Likewise, the general public also passed through the road on their way up to the old 
turkey farm about a mile north of the arena, or to access the trail head on the north that lead 
out into the country, up to Snow Canyon and Winchester Hills. R 233 (Affid. Conrad 
Bowler 15); R 239-240 (Aff. Ethan Bundy 14); R 272-273 (Aff. G. Jennings 14); R 278 -
279 (Aff. M. Jennings 14). In addition, the public drove through the road to look at horses 
stabled along the road, to discuss business regarding their horses, and to buy and sell horses. 
R 234-235 (Aff. Conrad Bowler 117,11); 245 (Aff. V. Hafen 16); 274 (Aff. G. Jennings 1 
9). Plaintiffs' affiants have indicated that this use was by more than the neighbors, and was 
by the general public. Dixie has not disputed these facts, but has only alleged that any and 
all such use was by implied permission, by acquiescence. R 265. 
Dixie complains that Plaintiffs in their affidavits have not specifically identified any 
members of the general public, or told how many of them used the road, or how often. 
Dixie's brief, at 22. In so saying, Dixie conveniently overlooks the fact that it admitted it 
was unable to do so in its own discovery responses. Dixie was asked to identify by name, 
address and phone number all persons of whom it was aware that had knowledge of the 
general public's use of the road. Dixie's response was that this request was "so broad that it 
is overly burdensome, and therefore the Defendants believe that it is an impractical request 
and ... the Defendants would be without sufficient knowledge to know any such witnesses 
or individuals." R 264-265. Indeed, Dixie referred to use of the road by the unidentified 
"general public" (R 265) in its statement that all use of the road was by acquiescence, since 
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use of the road was so extensive it was impossible to identify all the users. If use of the road 
truly were by permission, or were somehow limited to only a few local residents, surely Dixie 
would be able to identify most if not all of the users. 
Numerous Utah cases have relied on general observations of road use by unidentified 
members of the general public. For example, in Renfrv, the court stated that "[t]he record 
provides clear and convincing evidence that the continuous use of the Road has been by 
members of the public." Id. at *5. The court then quoted the following statements as 
specific examples to support this conclusion: an affidavit statement that the road was used 
"by all types of outdoor vehicles approaching from the northwest to exploit the view"; other 
affidavit statements about the road that "it's a place where people used to drive out and 
drive to the end", and that "people would go out and look off that point as they would other 
points." (emphasis added) Finally was the statement that the road "has been a notorious 
area for four-wheelers and motorcycles to ride" and was "four-wheeler heaven." Id. at *5. 
None of these statements identified specific members of the public, or how often they used 
the road, or how many of them used the road, yet all of these statements were sufficient 
identification of public use to meet the clear and convincing evidence standard in the 
summary judgment context. It is also significant that one of the affiants in Renfrv had 
resided in the area for 21 years, but the court said he "clearly does not qualify as an adjacent 
landowner." Id. In similar fashion, many residents of the Ence Bowler Marsh subdivision 
near the road in question are also not adjacent landowners, but are members of the general 
public who happen to live close by. & 232-233. 
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Likewise in Thurman v. Byram, 626 P.2d 447 (Utah 1981), it was stated that 
"[njumerous witnesses testified that they had used the property frequently for more than 20 
years, that they had observed other members of the general public using the road." Id. at 
449. Furthermore, "[b]oth the former county sheriff and the present sheriff testified that 
they had observed the general public using the roadway for many years." Id. This use by the 
unidentified "general public" was sufficient for the court. In Bonner v. Sudbury', 417 P.2d 646 
(Utah 1966), acknowledgements by two neighbors that they had seen "the general public 
using McClelland Street" was sufficient to establish public use. Id. at 648. The court noted 
that further testimony of these two witnesses "particularized as to the classes of persons ... 
who used the street. Yet, in our judgment it can be said advisedly that the trial court could 
reasonably regard their further answers as not contradictory of, but rather as consistent with 
their statements that the public used it." Id. The dissent noted that these witnesses had 
gone on to say the use they had seen was by mostly local residents or their invitees, but 
conceded that there was occasional use of the road by school children as a shortcut, and 
unidentified members of the general public who thought it was a through street. Id. at 649-
650. This is just like the present case, in which a mixture of local residents, abutting 
landowners and the general public were observed using the road. 
Just as in these examples, use of the road at issue by far more than the local 
neighbors was clearly established. This is not a case where there was solely local traffic 
because of a dead end street or alley, such as Peterson v. Combe, or Pitts v. Roberts. In this case, 
the road connects between two city streets (K 244), and was extensively used as a 
thoroughfare by the public to get to trailheads to the north, a business to the west, or to and 
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from the arena itself for informal rodeo practices. R 233-235, 239-240,272-273. In sum, 
Plaintiffs' evidence is more than clear and convincing of general public use of the road. 
2. Use by Permission Dixie has repeatedly asserted that any and all use by the 
public of this road was somehow with express or implied permission. Dixie has tried to 
frame this point as supposedly being a disputed issue of fact. As discussed above, there is 
actually no disputed fact between the parties in this respect. Express permission for public 
use of the road occurred 4 to 6 times a year, after which permission for use was withdrawn 
(R 139, f 8 (Vol. II); R 140 110; R 132; R 232,14; R 239,13). As for implied permission, 
Dixie admits that this was just use by acquiescence (R 265), and both parties have 
acknowledged unfettered use of the road by the public due to Dixie's acquiescence. R 233-
234,15-8; R 256; R 265. The implied permissive use repeatedly referenced by Dixie is an 
issue of law: whether permission to overcome a public dedication can be implied by 
acquiescence as claimed by Dixie. 
In response to an interrogatory that Dixie identify all permissions it gave to the 
general public to use the road, and all overt actions it took to convey or express that 
permission, Dixie stated the following: 
The permission was, in fact, granted by acquiescence, since there was, as having 
heretofore been mentioned, adequate egress and ingress up until the point that the 
Plaintiff Jennings built the shopping center complex. Therefore, it was by 
acquiescence of anyone desiring to use the property and it was only until 
approximately two years ago that the Defendants stopped allowing the general public, 
the Defendants, and other parties, who in fact, would now have the status of a 
trespasser, if in fact, they came upon the property." 
R 265 # 4. From this we see that the implied permission frequently referred to by Dixie in 
its affidavits and discovery responses was nothing more or less than use due to Dixie's 
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acquiescence. Yet if acquiescence was the same as implied permission to use a road, the 
road dedication statute would be rendered meaningless, since virtually every property owner 
of such a road has acquiesced in its use. Courts will not accept an interpretation of the road 
dedication statute that would render that statute meaningless or makes its enforcement 
unlikely or impossible. See, e.g.,Dept. of Natural Resources v. Butler, 2006 UT App 444,1110-11. 
In reality, acquiescence in use of a road such as in the present case stands for the 
opposite proposition to that argued by Dixie. The Utah Supreme Court has said that "the 
owner's intent [to dedicate the road to the public] maybe inferred by the mere acquiescence 
in allowing the public to use the road." Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1099 
(Utah 1995). Indeed, the argument that "mere acquiescence in the use of the land by the 
public" does not show intent to dedicate a road to the public has been expressly overruled. 
Bertagnole v. Pine Meadow, 639 P.2d 211, 212-213 (Utah 1981), citing Thurman v. Byram, 626 
P.2d 447, 449 (Utah 1981). See also Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806, fn3 (Utah 
App. 1998). The Supreme Court's use of the term "inferred" in Draper City is significant. 
Essentially, the court was saying that if a property owner acquiesces in the use of his 
property for a road, we can infer an intent that the public dedication take place, rather than 
inferring permissive use that would deny public dedication as Dixie asserts. Hence, Dixie's 
repeated claim in its affidavits and discovery responses that all use of the road due to its 
acquiescence constituted use by implied permission is nothing more or less than an 
erroneous legal conclusion, directly contrary to Utah law. 
The permissive use element of a road dedication is a paradox. The public's use of the 
road is almost always with the owner's knowledge, yet the claimant is legally required to 
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show that the use was not permissive in order for a road dedication to be found. Heber City 
v, Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 311 (Utah 1997). If the owner knows of unauthorized use of his 
property, and yet allows such use to continue, he may feel that all such use is by his implied 
permission. The owner will say that permission is implied by the fact that he either does 
nothing to stop it, or does not make more than token efforts to stop the use that are 
ineffective because the public use continues. Indeed that is what Dixie is claiming here. If 
such a presumption were true, a road dedication would never take place, since the use would 
be permissive every time. 
It is because of this irony that the supreme court has concluded that the owner's 
acquiescence in use of the road is in fact an implied intent that it be dedicated to the public, 
rather than an implied permission that would deny such dedication. Any other interpretation 
would allow the property owner to profit by his own failure to block the public's use of the 
road. Analogy can be made to the law pertaining to prescriptive easements, whereby a 
landowner's knowing failure to prevent use of a road for a period in excess of 20 years is 
presumed to be adverse and not permissive. Martinet v. Wells, 2004 UT App 43, \ 22. 
Indeed, several Utah cases have found a road dedication where the owner failed to 
give permission for use of a road, and the public failed to ask for such permission. See e.g., 
Boyer v. Clark, 362 P.2d 107,108 (Utah 1958)(No evidence that "permission was asked or 
obtained" for use of road); Thuman v. Bjram, 626 P.2d 447, 449 (Utah 1981)("[Until 1978 
they had never been asked not to use it [road], nor had they been prevented from doing so"); 
AWINC v. Simonsen, 112 P.3d 1228,15 (Utah App. 2005)("individuals testified that they 
were never asked not to use the road, nor were they told that they could not use the road"); 
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State v. Six Mile Ranch, 2006 UT App 104, 1123, 38 (dedication found of road that "was 
unobstructed and required neither the knowledge nor the permission of the Bleazards," but 
there was no dedication of other roads where "the property owners 'routinely asked the 
public to leave the Pass and Cable Roads," and therefore public's use of these other roads 
was not "as often as they found it convenient or necessary"). As noted by Plaintiffs' affiants, 
there was never any restrictions or signs in respect to use of the road, and they did not recall 
anyone from Dixie telling them that use of the road was by permission only. R 233-234 
(Aff. Conrad Bowler, 117-8); R 273 (Aff. Gilbert Jennings, 16). 
Dixie's lack of permission is further demonstrated by Dixie's attempt, sometime 
between 1985 and 1990, to put up posts and build a gate blocking public access to the road. 
After a brief legal dispute, Dixie did not proceed with the gate but went back to 
acquiescence in public use of the road. R 245 (Aff. V. Hafen 16). At no time was use of 
the road blocked. In sum, Dixie's claim that all use of the road was with express or implied 
permission is directly contrary to Dixie's own statements and Utah law. 
D. There was no Error by the District Court in Respect to the Width of the Road 
Dixie asserts that the trial court erred in not assessing the reasonable and necessary 
width of the roadway.7 There was no mention of this issue by Dixie before the trial court, 
i 
and therefore this is a new issue raised for the first time on appeal. Appellate courts will not 
hear new issues raised for the first time on appeal. Domingue^ v. Heward, 2006 UT App 20. 
7
 The width of the road is contained within the legal description of the Decree of 
Dedication. R 339. It must be remembered that this claim regarding the width of the road 
has no impact on the court's determination of dedication of the road to the public. Hence, 
even if this court were to determine that the trial court somehow erred in this respect, the 
road dedication itself would still stand. 
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Dixie can only get past this rule by a showing of plain error pursuant to Rule 103(d) 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence. A showing of plain error requires a demonstration that "(i) 
[a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is 
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome 
for [Defendant]."' State v. Alfatlam, 2006 UT App 511, at f 12. In respect to a claim of plain 
error, "the trial court commits error if it abuses its discretion by acting beyond the limits of 
reasonability." Id. at 20. As will be seen, Dixie is unable to meet these requirements here. 
The first element that Dixie must establish is that an error exists. An error would 
have occurred in respect to road width (1) if no evidence were presented by Plaintiffs 
regarding the width but the court granted a certain road width anyway, or (2) if the court had 
a duty to determine road width contrary to the determination of the city. In respect to the 
first point, Dixie ignores a mountain of evidence presented by Plaintiffs regarding the width 
of the road. Almost every affidavit Plaintiff submitted referenced the subject road as 
described in the dedication plat, "The 1020 West x 1050 North Street." The plat by which 
Dixie negotiated dedication of this road with St. George Gty clearly identifies the width of 
the road at fifty feet. R456. In addition, numerous legal documents of conveyance, 
including an easement from Dixie itself to the Gty of St. George, identified this road as 
having a width of 50 feet. & 167-171; 181, A.4.1 and A.4.2. 
Furthermore, the Utah Code requires that "[t]he scope of the right-of-way is that 
which is reasonable and necessary to ensure safe travel according to the facts and 
circumstances." Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(3). Since the road at issue connects two city 
streets (K 244 Aff. H. Val Hafen \ 3) and is located within a city rather than being an 
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isolated road in a canyon or a livestock trail across an uninhabited meadow as in many road 
dedication cases, the width of the road needed for safe travel will be set by the city. Indeed, 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-108 provides that "[t]he width of rights-of-way for public highways 
shall be set as the highway authorities of the state, counties, or municipalities may determine 
for the highways under their respective jurisdiction."8 Hence, it was for the Gty of St. 
George, not the court, to decide the safe width of this roadway. 
The second element that Dixie must establish in its claim of plain error is that the 
error should have been obvious to the trial court. As noted above, the trial court was aware 
that the road was within the city. The court had before it a plat and numerous documents of 
conveyance that identified the road width at fifty feet. Dixie produced nothing to counter 
this, but indeed has acknowledged that a city street such as this must be fifty feet wide, just 
as is shown on the plat. Dixie brief at 32. Moreover, the evidence before the trial court was 
that the general public used this road almost everyday for a large number of purposes. R 
233-235 (Aff. Conrad Bowler, fl 5-11); R. 283-284 (Aff. Lewis Bowler, Iff 2-8). The road is 
located in a residential area in a city where repeated and frequent use is likely, and a narrow 
road width would not suffice or provide for safe travel. This is not a case about a mountain 
road or meadow sheep trail in an isolated area. There was nothing obvious about the 
supposed need to establish a reasonable width of the road when the documents before the 
trial court, the location of the road and the frequency of use of the road all indicated that a 
8
 It is significant that Utah Code Ann. f 72-5-108 refers to the 'width' of the road, while 
Utah Code Ann. f 72-5-104(3) refers to the 'scope' of the road needed for safe travel. To 
the extent this reference to the 'scope' is interpreted to mean the 'width' of the road (as has 
occurred in a number of judicial interpretations), there would appear to be a conflict between 
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minimum standard city street width would be necessary for safe travel. In short, the trial 
court acted reasonably in identifying the width of the road at fifty feet. "The trial court 
commits error if it abuses its discretion by acting beyond the limits of reasonability." State v. 
Alfatlam, 2006 UT App 511, at f 20. There was nothing unreasonable about the court's 
determination here. 
The third element that Dixie must prove to sustain its claim of plain error is that "the 
error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome for [Defendant]." Id. at ^ 12. This is the most telling element of all in this case. As 
Dixie itself has acknowledged, St. George City has set the width of streets such as this at fifty 
feet. Dixie's brief, at 32. Hence, even if the trial court did somehow commit error in this 
case, Dixie will gain nothing by it, since the width of the road in the end will still have to be 
established at fifty feet. Hence, at worst, the court's inclusion of a width of 50 feet in its 
Decree of Dedication was harmless error. 
In sum, the district court did not err in respect to the width of the street. 
E. St. George City is not an Indispensible Party 
Dixie asserts that Plaintiffs improperly failed to name St. George City as an 
indispensable party on the basis that Plaintiffs' requested recognition of the road as 
abandoned to the public would somehow take away the city's easement rights to said 
property and give it to the state rather than the city. Dixie's brief, at 6. Dixie also asserts 
that the district court erred in not following the two step process in Rule 19 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure to determine if St. George City were an indispensable party. 
the two statutes as to which governmental entity— the courts or the city— should determine 
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However, the reason the trial court did not address this is because the issue was not really 
raised at all before the trial court, and is an issue raised for the first time on appeal. While 
Dixie noted at one point that the city was not a party to the suit (K 130), at no point did it 
move to make the city a party or suggest that this needed to be done. Its argument was that 
Plaintiffs lacked standing themselves to pursue a dedication. 
Dixie is correct that "a party may raise the issue of failure to join an indispensable 
party at any time in the proceedings, including for the first time on appeal." Cassidy v. Salt 
Lake County Fire Sen Council, 976 P.2d 607, f? (Utah App. 1999). In such a case, the appellate 
court will address the merits of the claim, and will review whether complete relief can be 
afforded among those already parties in the absence of St. George Gty, and whether the 
absent person claims an interest in the subject matter of the action and continuing without 
that person would (1) impair the person's ability to protect his or her interest, or (2) expose 
the parties already joined to the action to multiple litigation. Id. at 110 (citations omitted). 
Dixie asserts that "the effect of Plaintiffs' claims in this case and the District Court's 
Decree of Dedication were to declare property and property rights purportedly owned by 
the city of St. George to have been abandoned to the state, without Plaintiffs naming St. 
George as a party to this case." Dixie's brief, at 6. Dixie then claims that because Plaintiffs 
have asserted that the city has an easement/ownership rights already in the road, "the 
resolution of this litigation in favor of either Plaintiffs or in favor of Dixie is likely to impair 
or impede the City's ability to protect its alleged interests." Dixie's brief at 34. In making 
a dedicated road's width. 
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these statements, Dixie displays a misunderstanding of the consequences of a road 
dedication by assuming that the state, rather than the city would be the recipient of the road. 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1) does not require joinder of the city as a party in a road 
dedication action. It speaks of roads being dedicated to the 'public/ not the state. Subpart 
(2) of this same statute says that "[t]he dedication and abandonment creates a right-of-way 
held by the state in accordance with Sections 72-3-102, 72-3-104, 72-3-105, and 72-5-103." 
To understand who actually receives title to a dedicated road, we must review these statutes. 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-3-102 says that state highways for which the state holds title are 
only those designated under Title 72, chapter 4 of the Utah Code. Utah Code Ann. § 72-4-
102.5 says that a state highway, also known as a Class A state road, is one that is to 
"primarily move higher traffic volumes over longer distances than highways under local 
jurisdiction" (subpart (3)(b)), and shall "exclude all collector highways and local roads" 
(subpart (5)(c)). Clearly then, the state itself would not receive sole title to the road in 
question, since it is merely a local road. 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-3-104 says that "[c]ity streets comprise highways, roads, and 
streets within the corporate limits of the municipalities that are not designated as class A 
state roads or as class B roads." We have already seen above that the road at issue is not a 
Class A state road, nor would it be a Class B road under Utah Code Ann. § 72-3-103, since 
Gass B roads are only those "situated outside of incorporated municipalities." Section 72-3-
104, subpart 3 states that title for virtually all city streets is held by the city itself if the city is 
in a larger county, or title is joint between the city and state in smaller counties. Whether St. 
George is in a larger or smaller county is immaterial since title it receives from the dedication 
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will be identical to title it already holds in all its other streets and therefore its rights would 
not be affected. Finally, section 72-3-104 subpart 4 states that "[t]he municipal governing 
body exercises sole jurisdiction and control of the city streets within the municipality." 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-3-105 deals only with Class D roads, which are only those not 
already designated as another class of road. As we have seen, the road at issue is classified as 
a Class C road, and therefore this statute does not apply to it. Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-103 
merely indicates that if title to real property acquired in a road dedication is less than fee 
simple, it is held solely by the city in a large county, or jointly by the state and city if the city 
is in a small county, the same as fee title interests. 
The bottom line from these statutes is that the effect of the road dedication in this 
case is to vest the same title in the City of St. George as the city has in its other city streets. 
Title to the dedicated road does not go solely to the State of Utah. Hence, the dedication 
does not take any title or rights from the city, as Dixie suggests. The prior conveyances to 
the city by Dixie and adjacent property owners of a utility easement and a four foot strip of 
property to be added to the road (K K 181, A.4.1 and A.4.2) would simply merge into the 
new title. Miller v. Martineau, 983 P.2d 1107, \ 30 (Utah App. 1999). On the other hand, if 
Dixie were to prevail, the city would lose nothing that it previously had. The utility easement 
it received from Dixie and the four foot strip it received from Dixie and adjacent property 
owners would not be lost, but would remain in place the same as before. Hence, no matter 
who prevails in this action, the city's rights will not be adversely affected. The simple reality 
is that the city's easement and the road dedication at issue are distinct, and involve entirely 
separate property rights. The city's easements are not threatened at all by the dedication. 
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Dixie may assert that the city's ability to protect its interest maybe impaired because 
it may lose a potential or expectancy interest in the street if the street is not dedicated to the 
public. However, Dixie has acknowledged that the city has previously declined to pursue 
dedication of this street, and therefore has shown that it apparently has no expectancy 
interest in the street, or at least none that it intends to assert. & 139, ft 6-7. Furthermore, 
any interest by the city in the street is coincident with that of Plaintiffs, and therefore the 
lack of the Gty s presence as a party will not expose it to any risk since Plaintiffs are ardently 
seeking the road. This is not a case where some unique interest of the city will not be 
adequately protected if the city is not made a party. The city has always been aware of the 
present litigation (K 31-33) and could have moved to intervene if it felt its interests were at 
risk, but has not done so. Complete relief in this case can be afforded among those already 
parties in the absence of St. George Gty. 
Numerous road dedication cases in Utah have been between private parties, without 
joinder of the governmental entity that would receive title and responsibility for the road if it 
were dedicated.9 Courts have never indicated in any of these cases that joinder of the 
governmental entity was required. Significantly, in Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.ld 910 (Utah App. 
1996), this court; specifically declined to find an abuse of discretion by the trial court for 
failing to join Midway Gty to the suit under Rule 19. Id., n.l. In sum, there was no error 
here in respect to joinder of the Gty of St. George, since it is not an indispensable party. 
9
 See: Morris v. Blunt, 161 P. 1127 (Utah 1916), Deseret Livestock v. Sharp, 259 P.2d 607 (Utah 
1953), Boyerv. Clark, 326 P.2d 107 (Utah 1958), Clark v. Erekson, 341 P.2d 424 (Utah 1959), 
Bonner v. Sudbury, 417 P.2d 646 (Utah 1966), Peterson v. Combe, 438 P.2d 545 (Utah 1968), 
Thurman v. Byram, 626 P.2d 447 (Utah 1981), Bertagnole v. Pine Meadow, 639 P.2d 211 (Utah 
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X. CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly deemed all of Plaintiffs' facts admitted, due to Dixie's failure 
to follow the requirements of Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Gvil Procedure. The trial court 
did not improperly weigh any disputed evidence, since there was no disputed evidence to 
weigh. Plaintiffs met their burden of proving dedication of the road at issue by clear and 
convincing evidence. Plaintiffs have standing to pursue dedication of the road, and are not 
precluded from doing so or from testifying of public use because they are former or present 
owners of abutting property. There was no error in respect to the road width set by the trial 
court's Decree of Dedication, or in respect to joinder of the Qty of St. George, and the city 
is not an indispensable party. The ruling of the trial court should accordingly be upheld. 
Respectfully submitted this December 2007. 
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72-5-103 TRANSPORTATION CODE 
(12) the mitigation of impacts from public transporta-
tion projects. 2001 
72-5-103. Acquisition of rights-of-way and other real 
property — Title to property acquired. 
(1) The department may acquire any real property or inter-
ests in real property necessary for temporary, present, or 
reasonable future state transportation purposes by gift, agree-
ment, exchange, purchase, condemnation, or otherwise. 
(2) (a) (i) Title to real property acquired by the department 
or the counties, cities, and towns by gift, agreement, 
exchange, purchase, condemnation, or otherwise for 
highway rights-of-way or other transportation pur-
poses may be in fee simple or any lesser estate or 
interest. 
(ii) Title to real property acquired by the depart-
ment for a public transit project shall be transferred 
to the public transit district responsible for the 
project. 
(iii) A public transit district shall cover all costs 
associated with any condemnation on its behalf, 
(b) If the highway is a county road, city street under 
joint title as provided in Subsection 72-3-104(3), or right-
of-way described in Title 72, Chapter 5, Part 3, Rights-of-
way Across Federal Lands Act, title to all interests in real 
property less than fee simple held under this section is 
held jointly by the state and the county, city, or town 
holding the interest. 
(3) A transfer of land bounded by a highway on a right-of-
way for which the public has only an easement passes the title 
of the person whose estate is transferred to the middle of the 
highway. 2001 
72-5-104. Public use const i tut ing dedication — Scope. 
(1) A highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use of the 
public when it has been continuously used as a public thor-
oughfare for a period of ten years. 
(2) The dedication and abandonment creates a right-of-way 
held by the state in accordance with Sections 72-3-102, 72-3-
104, 72-3-105, and 72-5-103. 
(3) The scope of the right-of-way is that which is reasonable 
and necessary to ensure safe travel according to the facts and 
circumstances. 2000 
72-5-105. Highways, streets, or roads once establ ished 
continue until abandoned — Temporary clo-
sure. 
(1) All public highways, streets, or roads once established 
shall continue to be highways, streets, or roads until aban-
doned or vacated by order of a highway authority having 
jurisdiction or by other competent authority. 
(2) (a) For purposes ofassessment, upon the recordation of 
an order executed by the proper authority with the county 
recorder's office, title to the vacated or abandoned high-
way, street, or road shall vest to the adjoining record 
owners, with V2 of the width of the highway, street, or road 
assessed to each of the adjoining owners. 
(b) Provided, however, that should a description of an 
owner of record extend into the vacated or abandoned 
highway, street, or road that portion of the vacated or 
abandoned highway, street, or road shall vest in the 
record owner, with the remainder of the highway, street, 
or road vested as otherwise provided in this Subsection 
(2). 
(3) (a) In accordance with this section, a state or local 
highwav authority may temporarily close a class B or D 
road, an R.S. 2477 right-of-way, or a portion of a class B or 
D road or R.S. 2477 right-of-way. 
(bj A temporary closure authorized under this section 
is not an abandonment. 
(c) A temporary closure under Subsection (3)(a) m a 
authorized only under the following circumstances-
(ij when a federal authority, or other person n 
vides an alternate route to an R.S. 2477 right-0f.f 
or portion of an R.S. 2477 right-of-way that is; 
(A) accepted by the highway authority; am} 
(B) formalized b y 
( D a federal permit; or 
(II) a written agreement between theft 
eral authority or other person and the hfe 
way authority; or 
(ii) when a state or local highway authority defo 
mines that correction or mitigation of injury to n 
vate or public land resources is necessary on or ne 
a class B or D road or portion of a class B or D roa 
(d) A highway authority shall reopen an R.S. 24' 
right-of-way or portion of an R.S 2477 right-of-way tei 
porarily closed under this section if the alternate route 
closed for any reason. 
(e) A temporary closure authorized under Subsectit 
C3)(c)Cii) shall: 
(i) be authorized annually; and 
(ii) not exceed two years or the time it takes 
complete the correction or mitigation, whichever 
less. 
(4) Prior to authorizing a temporary closure under Subse 
tion (3), a highway authority shall: 
(a) hold a hearing on the proposed temporary closur-
(b) provide notice of the hearing by: 
(i) mailing a notice to the Department of Transpo 
ta t ion and all owners of property abutting the higl 
way; and 
(ii) (A) publishing the notice in a newspaper 
general circulation in the county at least once 
week for four consecutive weeks prior to tl 
hearing; or 
(B) posting the notice in three public places ft 
at least four consecutive weeks prior to tl 
hearing; and 
(c) pass an ordinance authorizing the temporary cl< 
sure. 
(5) The right-of-way and easements, if any, of a proper! 
owner and the franchise rights of any public utility may not t 
impaired by a temporary closure authorized under this set 
tion. 2<X 
72-5-106. Expirat ion of franchise of toll bridge or roa( 
If the franchise of any toll bridge or road expires b 
limitation, forfeiture, or nonuser it is a free public highwa, 
and no claim shall be valid against the public for right-of-wa 
or for land or material comprising the bridge or road. 191 
72-5-107. United States patents — Patentee an 
county to assert claims to roads crossm 
land. 
(1) (a) If any person acquires title from the United State 
to any land in this state over which any public highwa 
extends t h a t has not been duly platted, and that has nc 
been continuously used as a public highway for a Verl0(t 
ten years , the person shall within three months at 
receipt of the person's patent assert the person's claim ° 
damages in writing to the county executive of the coun . 
in which the land is situated. , . 
(b) The county legislative body shall have an addition^ 
period of three months in which to begin proceedings 
condemn the land according to law. , 
(2) (a) The highway shall continue open as a public nig 
way dur ing the periods described under Subsection U^ 
(b) If no action is begun by the county executive wi 
the period described under Subsection (1Kb), the hignw • 
shall be considered to be abandoned by the public-
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/Q) In case of a failure by the person so acquiring title to 
blic lands to assert his claim for damage during the three 
onths from the time the person received a patent to the 
l nds, the person shall thereafter be barred from asserting or 
overing
 a n y damages by reason of the public highway, and 
,i public highway shall remain open. 1998 
72-5-108. Width of rights-of-way for public h ighways . 
The width of rights-of-way for public highways shall be set 
as the highway authorities of the state, counties, or munici-
nalities may determine for the highways under their respec-
tive jurisdiction. 1998 
72-5-109- Contributions of property by count ies and 
municipal i t ies . 
Counties and municipalities may contribute real or personal 
property to the department for state transportation purposes. 
2001 
72-5-110. Acquisit ion of personal property. 
The department may acquire by gift, agreement, exchange, 
purchase, or otherwise machinery, tools, equipment, materi-
als, supplies, or other personal property necessary for the 
administration, construction, maintenance, and operation of 
the state highways, and may sell, exchange, or otherwise 
dispose of the machinery, tools, equipment, materials, sup-
plies, and other personal property when no longer suitable or 
required for state transportation purposes. 2001 
72-5-111. Disposal of real property. 
(1) (a) If the department determines that any real property 
or interest in real property, acquired for a highway 
purpose, is no longer necessary for the purpose, the 
department may lease, sell, exchange, or otherwise dis-
pose of the real property or interest in the real property. 
(b) (i) Real property may be sold at private or public 
sale. 
(ii) Except as provided in Subsection (l)(c) related 
to exchanges, proceeds of any sale shall be deposited 
with the state treasurer and credited to the Trans-
portation Fund. 
(c) If approved by the commission, real property or an 
interest in real property may be exchanged by the depart-
ment for other real property or interest in real property, 
including improvements, for highway purposes. 
(2) (a) In the disposition of real property at any private 
sale, first consideration shall be given to the original 
grantor or the original grantor's heirs. 
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 78-34-20, 
" no portion of a parcel of real property acquired by the 
department is used for transportation purposes, then the 
original grantor or the grantor's heirs shall be given the 
opportunity to repurchase the parcel of real property at 
the department's original purchase price from the 
grantor. 
(O In accordance with Section 72-5-404, this Subsec-
tion (2) does not apply to property rights acquired in 
Proposed transportation corridors using funds from the 
transportation Corridor Preservation Revolving Loan 
Fund created in Section 72-2-117. 
[ va) Any sale, exchange, or disposal of real property or 
terest in real property made by the department under 
l s
 section, is exempt from the mineral reservation 
Provisions of Title 65A, Chapter 6, Mineral Leases. 
\u) Any deed made and delivered by the department 
tier this section without specific reservations in the 
eed is
 a conveyance of all the state's right, title, and 
crest in the real property or interest in the real 
72-5-112. Acquisit ion of real property from county, 
city, or other political subdiv i s ion — Ex-
change. 
The department may purchase or otherwise acquire from 
any county, city, or other political subdivision of the state real 
property or interests in real property which may be exchanged 
for or used in the purchase of other real property or interests 
in real property to be used in connection with the construction, 
maintenance, or operation of state highways. 1998 
72-5-113. Acquisit ion of entire lot, block, or tract — 
Sale or exchange of remainder. 
If a part of an entire lot, block, tract of land, or interest or 
improvement in real property is to be acquired by the depart-
ment and the remainder is to be left in a shape or condition of 
little value to its owner or to give rise to claims or litigation 
concerning damages, the department may acquire the whole of 
the property and may sell the remainder or may exchange it 
for other property needed for highway purposes. 1998 
72-5-114. Property acquired in advance of construc-
t ion — Lease or rental. 
(1) (a) The department may acquire real property or inter-
ests or improvements in real property in advance of the 
actual construction, reconstruction, or improvement of 
highways in order to save on acquisition costs or avoid the 
payment of excessive damages. 
(b) The real property or interests or improvements in 
real property may be leased or rented by the department 
in a manner, for a period of time, and for a sum deter-
mined by the department to be in the best interest of the 
state. 
(2) (a) The department may employ private agencies to 
manage rental properties when it is more economical and 
in the best interests of the state. 
(b) All moneys received for leases and rentals, after 
deducting any portion to which the federal government 
may be entitled, shall be deposited with the state trea-
surer and credited to the Transportation Fund. 1998 
72-5-115. Acquisit ion of property devoted to or held 
for other public use. 
(1) If property devoted to or held for some other public use 
for which the power of eminent domain might be exercised is 
to be taken for state transportation purposes, the department 
may, with the consent of the person or agency in charge of the 
other public use, condemn real property to be exchanged with 
the person or agency for the real property to be taken for state 
transportation purposes. 
(2) This section does not limit the department's authoriza-
tion to acquire, other than by condemnation, property for 
exchange purposes. 2001 
72-5-116. Exemption from state l icensure. 
In accordance with Section 61-2-3, an employee of the 
department when engaging in an act on behalf of the depart-
ment related to one or more of the following is exempt from 
licensure under Title 61, Chapter 2, Division of Real Estate: 
(1) acquiring real property pursuant to Section 72-5-
103; 
(2) disposing of real property pursuant to Section 72-5-
111; or 
(3) providing services that constitute property manage-
ment, as defined in Section 61-2-2. 2007 
PART 2 
RIGHTS-OF-WAY ACROSS STATE LANDS 
72-5-201. Purpose statement. 
(1) (a) The Legislature recognizes that highways provide 
tangible benefits to private and public lands of the state 
23 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 7 
s int'l, 569 R2d 1122 (Utah 1977j. 
potions and affidavits. 
^Applicability of rule. 
_ _ Court orders. 
The five-day notice of hearing provision of 
Subdivision (d) does not apply to orders made 
hv a court, such as a show cause order. Bott v. 
Bott, 20 Utah 2d 329, 437 P.2d 684 (1968). 
New trial. 
provision that notice of hearing on motion be 
served not later than five days before the time 
specified for the hearing does not apply to 
motion for new trial and such notice is not 
integral part of motion for new trial; rule does 
not change procedure whereby a motion can be 
called up at any time parties desire to do so. 
Howard v. Howard, 11 Utah 2d 149, 356 P.2d 
275 (I960). 
—Compliance w i th rule. 
Actual notice. 
The trial court may dispense with technical 
compliance with the five-day notice provision of 
Subdivision (d) if there is satisfactory proof that 
a party had actual notice and time to prepare to 
meet the questions raised by the motion. 
Jensen v. Eames. 30 Utah 2d 423, 519 P2d 236 
(1974); Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 794 
P.2d 482 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), rev'd on other 
grounds, 827 P.2d 212 (Utah 1992). 
Ineffective not ice . 
Eight days' notice of trial was ineffective to 
give five days' notice when notice was by mail, 
since Saturday, Sunday, and three days for 
mailing were to be deducted from eight-day 
period. Mickelson v. Shelley, 542 P.2d 740 (Utah 
1975). 
Time to prepare. 
Plaintiff was not prejudiced by two-day no-
tice of hearing to release property subject to 
writ of attachment where he had adequate time 
to prepare for hearing and defendant was re-
quired to post cashier's check in lieu of security. 




Neither plaintiff's failure to serve motion for 
continuance five days before date set for hear-
ing nor failure to file affidavits accompanying 
motion justified denial of motion where plain-
tiff's counsel did not learn of reason for plain-
tiff's inability to appear at hearing in time to 
make motion five days before hearing and Rule 
40(b) does not expressly require affidavits to 
accompany motion for continuance. Bairas v. 
Johnson, 13 Utah 2d 269, 373 R2d 375 (1962). 
Cited in Goddard v. Bundy, 121 Utah 299, 
241 P.2d 462 (1952); Mower v. Bohmke, 9 Utah 
2d 52, 337 P.2d 429 (1959); Western States 
Thrift & Loan Co. v. Blomquist, 29 Utah 2d 58, 
504 P.2d 1019 (1972); Connelly v. Rathjen, 547 
P.2d 1336 (Utah 1976); Genuine Parts Co. v. 
Larson, 555 P.2d 285 (Utah 1976); McEwen 
Irrigation Co. v. Michaud, 558 P.2d 606 (Utah 
1976); Utah Chiropractic Ass'n v. Equitable Life 
Assurance Soc'y, 579 P.2d 1327 (Utah 1978); 
Reagan Outdoor Adv.. Inc. v. Utah DOT, 589 
P.2d 782 (Utah 1979); Albrecht v. Uranium 
Servs., Inc., 596 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1979); Ute-Cal 
Land Dev. v. Intermountain Stock Exch., 628 
P.2d 1278 (Utah 1981); Bennion v. Hansen, 699 
P.2d 757 (Utah 1985); K.O. v. Denison, 748 P.2d 
588 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); P & B Land, Inc. v. 
Klungendk. 751 P.2d 274 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); 
Huston v. Lewis, 818 P.2d 531 (Utah 1991); 
Wilcox v. Geneva Rock Corp., 911 P.2d 367 
(Utah 1996); Low v. City of Monticello, 2002 UT 
90. 54 P3d 1153. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 20 et 
seq.; 56 Am. Jur. 2d Motions, Rules, and Orders 
§ 10; 62B Am. Jur. 2d Process §§ 114-117, 
227-229. 
C.J.S. — 60 C.J.S. Motions and Orders § 8; 
66 C.J.S. Notice § 27 et seq.; 71 C.J.S. Pleading 
§§ 98, 114, 219; 72 C.J.S. Process §§ 72, 78. 
A.L.R. — Vacating judgment or granting new 
trial in civil case, consent as ground of after 
expiration of term or time prescribed by statute 
or rules of court, 3 A.L.R.3rl 1191. 
Attorney's inaction as excuse for failure to 
timely prosecute action, 15 A.L.R.3d 674. 
Validity of service of summons or complaint 
on Sunday or holiday, 63 A.L.R.3d 423. 
Amendment, after expiration of time for fil-
ing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion 
made in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845. 
Consequences of prosecution's failure to file 
timely brief in appeal by accused. 27 A.L.R.4th 
213. * 
What constitutes bringing an action to trial 
or other activity in case sufficient to avoid 
dismissal under state statute or court rule 
requiring such activity within stated time. 32 
A.L.R.4th 840. 
PART III. PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS 
Rule 7. Pleadings allowed; motions, memoranda, hear-
ings, orders , objection to commissioner's order. 
(a) Pleadings. There shall be a complaint and an answer; a reply to a 
counterclaim; an answer to a cross-claim, if the answer contains a cross-claim; 
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under the provisions of Rule 14; and
 a t, - , 
complaint is served. No other pleading shalH P a r t y a n s w e r > l f a third-party 
may order a reply to an answer or a third
 T ? a l l°wed, except that the court 
(b) Mutums. An application to the court f a n s w e r -
which, unless made during a hearing or tri 1 H" o r d e r s h a 1 1 b e b-V motion 
commissioner, shall be made in accordance »•» l n Proceedings before a court 
wntmg and state succinctly and with
 Dart;; , t h i s r u l e - A motion shall be in 
grounds for the relief sought. C l a r i t y the rehef sought and the 
(c) Memoranda. 
Ml) Memoranda required, exceptions fr 
uncontested or ex parte motions, s h a l l ' h * times- M motions, except 
memorandum. Within ten days after
 S e r v i
 a cc
°mpanied by a supporting 
memorandum, a party opposing the
 m o H f
 t h e
 motion and supporting 
opposition. Within five days after service of H a11 f l l e a memorandum in 
the moving party may file a reply mem0m, i Memorandum in opposition, 
rebuttal of matters raised in the mem„ ,m> w h i c h shall be limited to 
memoranda will be considered without l e a v < * i n opposition. No other 
proposed order to its initial memorandum C o u r t - A P a r t y may attach a 
(c)(2) Length. Initial memoranda shall 
without leave of the court. Reply m e m o r l ^ 6 X c e e d 1 0 P a e e s o f argument 
argument without leave of the court. The en, ? S h a l ] n o t exceed 5 pages of 
over-length memorandum upon ex parte *Tv m a y P e r m i t a Party to file an 
causf• ^ c a t i o n and a showing of good 
(c)(3) Content. 
(c)(3)(A) A memorandum supporting
 a mnt-
contain a statement of material facts as to w b ; T f° r summary judgment shall 
genuine issue exists. Each fact shall be sen**.* ^ e moving party contends no 
supported by citation to relevant mater ia l ! l y s t a t e d and numbered and 
materials. Each fact set forth in the moving S U ° h a s affidavits or discovery 
admitted for the purpose of summary i u c W a r t y ' s memorandum is deemed 
responding party. a ^ e n t U n l e s g c o n t r o v e r t e d b y t h e 
(c)(3)(B) A memorandum opposing a moti , 
contain a verbatim restatement of each of S? r S u mmary judgment shall 
controverted, and may contain a separate « \ m ° v i n S P a r t y ' s f a c t s that is 
dispute. For each of the moving party's facts r > ; e m e n t of additional facts in 
party shall provide an explanation of the e r o n ^ T i 8 controverted, the opposing 
citation to relevant materials, such as a f f id^ f f o r a ^ y dispute, supported by 
any additional facts set forth in the opposW ° r discovery materials. For 
separately stated and numbered and
 S U D L f ^ 0 r a n d u m , each fact shall be 
m f S ? G h a S a f f i davi ts or discovery SaZ i b 7 citation to supporting 
(c)(3)(C) A memorandum with more t h a ^ n 1 8 -
a
 r v o e v ^ C ° A
n t e n t S a n d a t a b l e o f
 au thor i t i e s P a . f e s °f argument shall contain 
(c)(3)(D) A party may attach as exhibits to
 a
 P a S e references, 
ot documents cited in the memorandum ! m ? m ° r a n d u m relevant portions 
m a t e n a l s
- '
 S U c h
 as affidavits or discovery 
(d) Request to submit for decision. When h • r-
may file a "Request to Submit for Decision >"Th * g i s complete, either party 
shall state the date on which the motion' w l 7 r e ( * u es t to submit for decision 
memorandum if any, was served, the date the " T ^ ' t h e d a t e t h e opposing 
served and whether a hearing has been r e Q U p f P ] y memorandum, if any, was 
the motion will not be submitted for decision ^ I f n o P a r t y files a request, 
(e) Hearings. The court may hold a hear?' 
request a hearing in the motion, in a m e m o r S ° n a n y m o t i o n - A party may 
for decision. A request for hearing shall be sen , ° r i n t h e r e ques t to submit 
of the document containing the request. T h e , a t e l y identified in the caption 
hearing on a motion under Rule 56 or a motion ^ S h a 1 1 & r a n t a r e c i u es t for a 
or any claim or defense in the action unless th W o u l d d i s P o s e o f t h e action 
e c
°Urt finds that the motion or 
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opposition to the motion is frivolous or the issue has been authoritatively 
decided. 
(f) Orders. 
(f)(1) An order includes every direction of the court, including a minute 
order entered in writing, not included in a judgment. An order for the payment 
of money may be enforced in the same manner as if it were a judgment. Except 
as otherwise provided by these rules, any order made without notice to the 
adverse party may be vacated or modified by the judge who made it with or 
without notice. Orders shall state whether they are entered upon trial, 
stipulation, motion or the court's initiative. 
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an 
initial memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing 
party shall, within fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon the other 
parties a proposed order in conformity with the court's decision. Objections to 
the proposed order shall be filed within five days after service. The party 
preparing the order shall file the proposed order upon being served with an 
objection or upon expiration of the time to object. 
(f)(3) Unless otherwise directed by the court, all orders shall be prepared as 
separate documents and shall not incorporate any matter by reference. 
(g) Objection to court commissioner's recommendation. A recommendation of 
a court commissioner is the order of the court until modified by the court. A 
party may object to the recommendation by filing an objection in the same 
manner as filing a motion within ten days after the recommendation is made 
in open court or, if the court commissioner takes the matter under advisement, 
ten days after the minute entry of the recommendation is served. A party may 
respond to the objection in the same manner as responding to a motion. 
(Amended effective November 1, 2003; April 1, 2004; November 1, 2005.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — The practice 
for courtesy copies varies by judge and so is not 
regulated by rule. Each party should ascertain 
whether the judge wants a courtesy copy of that 
party's motion, memoranda and supporting 
documents and, if so. when and where to de-
liver them. 
Paragraph (f) applies to all orders, not just 
orders upon motion. 
Amendment Notes . — The 2003 amend-
ment deleted "denominated as such" after 
"counterclaim" in Subdivision (a); rewrote Sub-
divisions (b) and (c): and added Subdivisions (d) 
to (g). 
The 2004 amendment inserted "or in pro-
ceedings before a court commissioner" in Sub-
division (b); substituted the first paragraph in 
Subdivision (c)(2) for a list of maximum lengths 
for different types of memoranda; in Subdivi-
sion (f)(2), substituted "serve upon the other 
parties" for "file" in the first sentence and added 
the last sentence; in Subdivision (g), substi-
tuted "recommendation" for "recommended or-
der" several times and substituted "made in 
open court" for "entered" and added the clause 
beginning "or, if" in the second sentence; and 
added the second paragraph of the Advisory 
Committee Note. 
The 2005 amendment added Subdivision 
(f)(3). 
Compi ler ' s No te s . — This rule is similar to 
Rule 7, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References . — Amendment of plead-
ings to conform to evidence, motion for. 
U.R.C.P. 15(b). 
Commencement of action, U.R.C.P. 3. 
Consolidation of defenses made by motion, 
U.R.C.P. 12(g). 
Counterclaim and cross-claim, U.R.C.P. 13. 
Defenses and objections, U.R.C.P. 12. 
Denial of motion, pleading after, U.R.C.P. 
12(i). 
Directed verdict and judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict, motion for, U.R.C.P. 50. 
Dismissal of actions, U.R.C.P 41. 
Eminent domain proceedings, contents of 
complaint in, § 78-34-6. 
Evidence in support of motion, U.R.C.P. 
43(b). 
Execution and proceedings supplemental 
thereto, U.R.C.P. 69A et seq. 
Extraordinary relief, U.R.C.P. 65B. 
Forcible entry or detainer, proof required, 
§ 78-36-9. 
Form of pleadings, U.R.C.P. 10. 
"Judgment" defined, U.R.C.P. 54(a). 
One form of action, U.R.C.P. 2. 
Partition of property, complaint, to set forth 
interests of all parties, § 78-39-2. 
Pleading special matters, U.R.C.P. 9. 
Relief from judgment or order, U.R.C.P 60. 
Requirements of signature, U.R.C.P. 11. 
Service and filing of motions, pleadings and 
other papers, U.R.C.P. 5. 
Special forms of writs abolished, U.R.C.P 
65B(a). 
Supreme Court, rulemaking power of, § 78-
2-4. 
Temporary restraining orders, setting aside, 
U.R.C.P. 65A. 
Time for service of written motions, U.R.C.P. 
6(d). 
Rule 19 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 72 
Rule 19. Joinder of persons needed for just adjudication. 
(aj Persons to be joined if feasible. A person who is subject to sendee of 
process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the 
subject matter of action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his 
absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) 
he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that 
the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair 
or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons 
already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or 
otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If he has 
not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party. If he should 
join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or, in a 
proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue and 
his joinder would render the venue of the action improper, he shall be 
dismissed from the action. 
(bj Determination by court whenever joinder not feasible. If a person as 
described in Subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court 
shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should 
proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person 
being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court 
include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence 
might be prejudicial to him or those already parties; second, the extent to 
which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or 
other measure, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a 
judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether 
the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for 
nonjoinder. 
(c) Pleading reasons for nonjoinder. A pleading asserting a claim for relief 
shall state the names, if known to the pleader, of any persons as described in 
Subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof who are not joined, and the reasons why they are 
not joined. 
(d) Exception of class actions. This rule is subject to the provisions of Rule 
23. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Compiler's Notes . — This rule is substan-
tially identical to Rule 19, F.R.C.P. 
Discretion of court. 
Indispensable parties. 
—Determination. 
—Failure to join. 
Assertion for first time at trial. 
Assertion for first time on appeal. 
Dismissal not bar to action on merits. 
—Partner in joint venture. 
—Two-part inquiry. 
Joinder not required. 
Necessary parties. 
—Corporate stock transfers. 
—Definition. 
—Denial of joinder. 
—Failure to intervene. 
Effect upon subsequent suit. 
—Failure to join. 
—Involuntary plaintiff. 
Relationship or interest. 
—Joinder not required. 
—Purpose of rule. 
Cited. 
Discret ion of court. 
Ordinarily, a trial court's determination 
properly entered under this rule will not be 
disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Seftel 
v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 941 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989), aff'd sub nom. Landes v. Capital 
City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990). 
Indispensable parties. 
—Determinat ion. 
Only when the court finds a party necessary, 
but joinder not feasible, must the court address 
indispensability. Johnson v. Higley, 1999 UT 
App 278, 989 P.2d 61. 
—Fai lure to join. 
Trial court abused its discretion in dismiss-
ing an action with prejudice for failure to join 
indispensable parties, and not allowing an 
amendment or granting a continuance, where 
defendant claimed no surprise but merely re-
lied on the likelihood of increased costs and 
Rule 56 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 188 
scheduled appearance in another court on that the date of notice of entry ol such judgment, 
date, but due to fact that there were no Jaw or rather than from the date of judgment. Buck-
motion days between time objection was filed ner v. Mam Realty & Ins. Co., 4 Utah 2d 124, 
and trial date, objection was never heard, re- 288 P.2d 786 (1955) (but see Central Bank & 
fusal to set aside default judgment entered Trust Co. v Jensen, supra, and Rule 58A(d) 
when appellants failed to appear on trial date 
was an abuse of discretion Griffiths v Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods Corp v. 
Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977) Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965), 
T . f r 1 J.P.W. Enters., Inc v. Naef, 604 P2d 486 (Utah 
l i m e lor appeal. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 1986); 
Under former Rule 73(h) the time for appeal ' ' ' T ] T ( , r n T>O,I 077 
from a default judgment in a city court ran from L a n d v" B r o w n > 2 0 0 0 U T 7 5 ' U VM 2 7 7 " 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reason- hearing as to determination of amount of dam-
able Assurance of Actual Notice Required for In ages, 15 A.L.R.od 586. 
Personam Default Judgment in Utah Graham Opening default or default judgment claimed 
v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937 to have been obtained because of attorney's 
AJTI. Jur. 2d. — 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § mistake as to time or place of appearance, trial, 
265 et seq. or filing of necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d 1255. 
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 187 to 218. Failure to give notice of application for de-
A.L.R. — Necessity of taking proof as to fault judgment where notice is required only by 
liability against defaulting defendant, 8 custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383. 
A.L.R.3d 1070. Failure of party or his attorney to appear at 
Appealability of order setting aside, or refus- pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303. 
ing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d Default judgments against the United States 
1272. under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190. 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move for summary 
judgment upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits 
shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show tha t there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be 
rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to 
the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy 
and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall 
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial 
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other 
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action 
as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed 
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and 
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such 
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified 
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copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached 
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supple-
mented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further 
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations 
or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered 
against a party failing to file such a response. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a 
party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse 
the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to 
be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just . 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant 
to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the 
court shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party 
the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused, 
including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may 
be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
(Amended effective November 1, 1997; November 1, 2004.) 
Amendment Notes . — The 2004 amend-
ment substituted "move for summary judg-
ment" for "move with or without supporting-
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor'' 
in Subdivisions (a) and (b); in Subdivision (c), 
deleted "filed and served" before "in accordance 
with" and substituted "Rule 7" for "CJA 4-501"; 
substituted "If" for "Should it appear to the 
satisfaction of the court at any time that" at the 
beginning of the first sentence in Subdivision 
(g); and made stylistic changes throughout. 
Compiler's Notes . — This rule is similar to 
Rule 56, RR.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Contempt generally, 
§§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq. 





—Extension of time to submit. 
—Failure to submit. 
—Inconsistency with deposition. 
—Necessity of opposing affidavits. 
Resting on pleadings. 
— Objection. 
—Sufficiency. 
——Hearsay and opinion testimony. 
—Supersedi ng p 1 ead itigs. 
—Unpleaded defenses. 
—Verified pleading. 
— Waiver of right to contest. 
—When unavailable. 
— Exclusive control of facts. 
—Who may make. 
Affirmative defense. 
Answers to interrogatories. 
Appeal. 
—Adversely affected party. 
— Standard of review. 
Applicability. 
Attorneys fees. 
Availability of motion. 
^°mpliance with rule, 
continuance for further discovery, 
^ s s - m o t i o n s . 
Discovery. 
Disputed facts. 
Effect of denial. 
Evidence. 
—Admissions of plaintiff. 
— Facts considered. 
— Improper evidence. 
— Proof. 
— Unsupported motion. 
—Weight of testimony. 
Implicit rulings. 
Improper party plaintiff. 
Issue of fact. 
— Contract interpretation. 
— Corporate existence. 
— Deeds. 
— Discovery of medical condition. 
— Intent to remove trustee. 




Motion for new trial. 
Motion to dismiss. 
Motion to reconsider. 
Notice. 
— Provision not jurisdictional. 
— Waiver of defect. 
Parties. 
Procedural due process. 
Purpose. 
